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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-46209 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/gem: Fix inconsistent plane dimension calculation in drm_gem_fb_init_with_funcs() drm_gem_fb_init_with_funcs() computes sub-sampled plane dimensions using plain integer division: unsigned int width = mode_cmd->width / (i ? info->hsub : 1); unsigned int height = mode_cmd->height / (i ? info->vsub : 1); However, the ioctl-level framebuffer_check() in drm_framebuffer.c uses drm_format_info_plane_width/height() which round up dimensions via DIV_ROUND_UP(). This inconsistency corrupts the subsequent GEM object size check for certain pixel format and dimension combinations. For example, with NV12 (vsub=2) and a 1-pixel-tall framebuffer the GEM size validation path sees height=0 instead of height=1. The expression (height - 1) then wraps to UINT_MAX as an unsigned int, causing min_size to overflow and wrap back to a small value. A tiny GEM object therefore passes the size guard, yet when the GPU accesses the chroma plane it will read or write memory beyond the object's bounds. Fix by replacing the open-coded divisions with drm_format_info_plane_width() and drm_format_info_plane_height(), which use DIV_ROUND_UP() and match the calculation already used in framebuffer_check(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-46190 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mtd: spi-nor: debugfs: fix out-of-bounds read in spi_nor_params_show() Sashiko noticed an out-of-bounds read [1]. In spi_nor_params_show(), the snor_f_names array is passed to spi_nor_print_flags() using sizeof(snor_f_names). Since snor_f_names is an array of pointers, sizeof() returns the total number of bytes occupied by the pointers (element_count * sizeof(void *)) rather than the element count itself. On 64-bit systems, this makes the passed length 8x larger than intended. Inside spi_nor_print_flags(), the 'names_len' argument is used to bounds-check the 'names' array access. An out-of-bounds read occurs if a flag bit is set that exceeds the array's actual element count but is within the inflated byte-size count. Correct this by using ARRAY_SIZE() to pass the actual number of string pointers in the array. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46177 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipmi: Add limits to event and receive message requests The driver would just fetch events and receive messages until the BMC said it was done. To avoid issues with BMCs that never say they are done, add a limit of 10 fetches at a time. In addition, an si interface has an attn state it can return from the hardware which is supposed to cause a flag fetch to see if the driver needs to fetch events or message or a few other things. If the attn bit gets stuck, it's a similar problem. So allow messages in between flag fetches so the driver itself doesn't get stuck. This is a more general fix than the previous fix for the specific bad BMC, but should fix the more general issue of a BMC that won't stop saying it has data. This has been there from the beginning of the driver. It's not a bug per-se, but it is accounting for bugs in BMCs. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46163 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: b43legacy: enforce bounds check on firmware key index in RX path Same fix as b43: the firmware-controlled key index in b43legacy_rx() can exceed dev->max_nr_keys. The existing B43legacy_WARN_ON is non-enforcing in production builds, allowing an out-of-bounds read of dev->key[]. Make the check enforcing by dropping the frame for invalid indices. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46122 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: b43: enforce bounds check on firmware key index in b43_rx() The firmware-controlled key index in b43_rx() can exceed the dev->key[] array size (58 entries). The existing B43_WARN_ON is non-enforcing in production builds, allowing an out-of-bounds read. Make the B43_WARN_ON check enforcing by dropping the frame when the firmware returns an invalid key index. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46110 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: stmmac: Prevent NULL deref when RX memory exhausted The CPU receives frames from the MAC through conventional DMA: the CPU allocates buffers for the MAC, then the MAC fills them and returns ownership to the CPU. For each hardware RX queue, the CPU and MAC coordinate through a shared ring array of DMA descriptors: one descriptor per DMA buffer. Each descriptor includes the buffer's physical address and a status flag ("OWN") indicating which side owns the buffer: OWN=0 for CPU, OWN=1 for MAC. The CPU is only allowed to set the flag and the MAC is only allowed to clear it, and both must move through the ring in sequence: thus the ring is used for both "submissions" and "completions." In the stmmac driver, stmmac_rx() bookmarks its position in the ring with the `cur_rx` index. The main receive loop in that function checks for rx_descs[cur_rx].own=0, gives the corresponding buffer to the network stack (NULLing the pointer), and increments `cur_rx` modulo the ring size. After the loop exits, stmmac_rx_refill(), which bookmarks its position with `dirty_rx`, allocates fresh buffers and rearms the descriptors (setting OWN=1). If it fails any allocation, it simply stops early (leaving OWN=0) and will retry where it left off when next called. This means descriptors have a three-stage lifecycle (terms my own): - `empty` (OWN=1, buffer valid) - `full` (OWN=0, buffer valid and populated) - `dirty` (OWN=0, buffer NULL) But because stmmac_rx() only checks OWN, it confuses `full`/`dirty`. In the past (see 'Fixes:'), there was a bug where the loop could cycle `cur_rx` all the way back to the first descriptor it dirtied, resulting in a NULL dereference when mistaken for `full`. The aforementioned commit resolved that *specific* failure by capping the loop's iteration limit at `dma_rx_size - 1`, but this is only a partial fix: if the previous stmmac_rx_refill() didn't complete, then there are leftover `dirty` descriptors that the loop might encounter without needing to cycle fully around. The current code therefore panics (see 'Closes:') when stmmac_rx_refill() is memory-starved long enough for `cur_rx` to catch up to `dirty_rx`. Fix this by explicitly checking, before advancing `cur_rx`, if the next entry is dirty; exit the loop if so. This prevents processing of the final, used descriptor until stmmac_rx_refill() succeeds, but fully prevents the `cur_rx == dirty_rx` ambiguity as the previous bugfix intended: so remove the clamp as well. Since stmmac_rx_zc() is a copy-paste-and-tweak of stmmac_rx() and the code structure is identical, any fix to stmmac_rx() will also need a corresponding fix for stmmac_rx_zc(). Therefore, apply the same check there. In stmmac_rx() (not stmmac_rx_zc()), a related bug remains: after the MAC sets OWN=0 on the final descriptor, it will be unable to send any further DMA-complete IRQs until it's given more `empty` descriptors. Currently, the driver simply *hopes* that the next stmmac_rx_refill() succeeds, risking an indefinite stall of the receive process if not. But this is not a regression, so it can be addressed in a future change. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46064 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ibmasm: fix heap over-read in ibmasm_send_i2o_message() The ibmasm_send_i2o_message() function uses get_dot_command_size() to compute the byte count for memcpy_toio(), but this value is derived from user-controlled fields in the dot_command_header (command_size: u8, data_size: u16) and is never validated against the actual allocation size. A root user can write a small buffer with inflated header fields, causing memcpy_toio() to read up to ~65 KB past the end of the allocation into adjacent kernel heap, which is then forwarded to the service processor over MMIO. Silently clamping the copy size is not sufficient: if the header fields claim a larger size than the buffer, the SP receives a dot command whose own header is inconsistent with the I2O message length, which can cause the SP to desynchronize. Reject such commands outright by returning failure. Validate command_size before calling get_mfa_inbound() to avoid leaking an I2O message frame: reading INBOUND_QUEUE_PORT dequeues a hardware frame from the controller's free pool, and returning without a corresponding set_mfa_inbound() call would permanently exhaust it. Additionally, clamp command_size to I2O_COMMAND_SIZE before the memcpy_toio() so the MMIO write stays within the I2O message frame, consistent with the clamping already performed by outgoing_message_size() for the header field. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46022 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: misc: ibmasm: fix OOB MMIO read in ibmasm_handle_mouse_interrupt() ibmasm_handle_mouse_interrupt() performs an out-of-bounds MMIO read when the queue reader or writer index from hardware exceeds REMOTE_QUEUE_SIZE (60). A compromised service processor can trigger this by writing an out-of-range value to the reader or writer MMIO register before asserting an interrupt. Since writer is re-read from hardware on every loop iteration, it can also be set to an out-of-range value after the loop has already started. The root cause is that get_queue_reader() and get_queue_writer() return raw readl() values that are passed directly into get_queue_entry(), which computes: queue_begin + reader * sizeof(struct remote_input) with no bounds check. This unchecked MMIO address is then passed to memcpy_fromio(), reading 8 bytes from unintended device registers. For sufficiently large values the address falls outside the PCI BAR mapping entirely, triggering a machine check exception. Fix by checking both indices against REMOTE_QUEUE_SIZE at the top of the loop body, before any call to get_queue_entry(). On an out-of-range value, reset the reader register to 0 via set_queue_reader() before breaking, so that normal queue operation can resume if the corrupted hardware state is transient. | ||||
| CVE-2026-45839 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: reject negative CO-RE accessor indices in bpf_core_parse_spec() CO-RE accessor strings are colon-separated indices that describe a path from a root BTF type to a target field, e.g. "0:1:2" walks through nested struct members. bpf_core_parse_spec() parses each component with sscanf("%d"), so negative values like -1 are silently accepted. The subsequent bounds checks (access_idx >= btf_vlen(t)) only guard the upper bound and always pass for negative values because C integer promotion converts the __u16 btf_vlen result to int, making the comparison (int)(-1) >= (int)(N) false for any positive N. When -1 reaches btf_member_bit_offset() it gets cast to u32 0xffffffff, producing an out-of-bounds read far past the members array. A crafted BPF program with a negative CO-RE accessor on any struct that exists in vmlinux BTF (e.g. task_struct) crashes the kernel deterministically during BPF_PROG_LOAD on any system with CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF=y (default on major distributions). The bug is reachable with CAP_BPF: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffed11818b6626 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 85 Comm: poc Not tainted 7.0.0-rc6 #18 PREEMPT(full) RIP: 0010:bpf_core_parse_spec (tools/lib/bpf/relo_core.c:354) RAX: 00000000ffffffff Call Trace: <TASK> bpf_core_calc_relo_insn (tools/lib/bpf/relo_core.c:1321) bpf_core_apply (kernel/bpf/btf.c:9507) check_core_relo (kernel/bpf/verifier.c:19475) bpf_check (kernel/bpf/verifier.c:26031) bpf_prog_load (kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3089) __sys_bpf (kernel/bpf/syscall.c:6228) </TASK> CO-RE accessor indices are inherently non-negative (struct member index, array element index, or enumerator index), so reject them immediately after parsing. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43502 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/rds: handle zerocopy send cleanup before the message is queued A zerocopy send can fail after user pages have been pinned but before the message is attached to the sending socket. The purge path currently infers zerocopy state from rm->m_rs, so an unqueued message can be cleaned up as if it owned normal payload pages. However, zerocopy ownership is really determined by the presence of op_mmp_znotifier, regardless of whether the message has reached the socket queue. Capture op_mmp_znotifier up front in rds_message_purge() and use it as the cleanup discriminator. If the message is already associated with a socket, keep the existing completion path. Otherwise, drop the pinned page accounting directly and release the notifier before putting the payload pages. This keeps early send failure cleanup consistent with the zerocopy lifetime rules without changing the normal queued completion path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-43499 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rtmutex: Use waiter::task instead of current in remove_waiter() remove_waiter() is used by the slowlock paths, but it is also used for proxy-lock rollback in rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() when invoked from futex_requeue(). In the latter case waiter::task is not current, but remove_waiter() operates on current for the dequeue operation. That results in several problems: 1) the rbtree dequeue happens without waiter::task::pi_lock being held 2) the waiter task's pi_blocked_on state is not cleared, which leaves a dangling pointer primed for UAF around. 3) rt_mutex_adjust_prio_chain() operates on the wrong top priority waiter task Use waiter::task instead of current in all related operations in remove_waiter() to cure those problems. [ tglx: Fixup rt_mutex_adjust_prio_chain(), add a comment and amend the changelog ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-43099 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: icmp: fix null-ptr-deref in icmp_build_probe() ipv6_stub->ipv6_dev_find() may return ERR_PTR(-EAFNOSUPPORT) when the IPv6 stack is not active (CONFIG_IPV6=m and not loaded), and passing this error pointer to dev_hold() will cause a kernel crash with null-ptr-deref. Instead, silently discard the request. RFC 8335 does not appear to define a specific response for the case where an IPv6 interface identifier is syntactically valid but the implementation cannot perform the lookup at runtime, and silently dropping the request may safer than misreporting "No Such Interface". | ||||
| CVE-2026-43057 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: correctly handle tunneled traffic on IPV6_CSUM GSO fallback NETIF_F_IPV6_CSUM only advertises support for checksum offload of packets without IPv6 extension headers. Packets with extension headers must fall back onto software checksumming. Since TSO depends on checksum offload, those must revert to GSO. The below commit introduces that fallback. It always checks network header length. For tunneled packets, the inner header length must be checked instead. Extend the check accordingly. A special case is tunneled packets without inner IP protocol. Such as RFC 6951 SCTP in UDP. Those are not standard IPv6 followed by transport header either, so also must revert to the software GSO path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-3497 | 5 Canonical, Debian, Openbsd and 2 more | 5 Ubuntu Linux, Debian Linux, Openssh and 2 more | 2026-10-15 | 7.5 High |
| Vulnerability in the OpenSSH GSSAPI delta included in various Linux distributions. This vulnerability affects the GSSAPI patches added by various Linux distributions and does not affect the OpenSSH upstream project itself. The usage of sshpkt_disconnect() on an error, which does not terminate the process, allows an attacker to send an unexpected GSSAPI message type during the GSSAPI key exchange to the server, which will call the underlying function and continue the execution of the program without setting the related connection variables. As the variables are not initialized to NULL the code later accesses those uninitialized variables, accessing random memory, which could lead to undefined behavior. The recommended workaround is to use ssh_packet_disconnect() instead, which does terminate the process. The impact of the vulnerability depends heavily on the compiler flag hardening configuration. | ||||
| CVE-2026-33389 | 1 Nozomi Networks | 3 Arc, Cmc, Guardian | 2026-10-15 | 7.5 High |
| An improper certificate/host key validation vulnerability was discovered in the Smart Polling functionality, which established encrypted connections to target devices without validating the remote host's identity, and no option was provided to enable it. A man-in-the-middle attacker positioned between a sensor and a polled device can, during a polling session, impersonate the device and intercept the communication, including the credentials used to access it. The captured credentials can then be replayed to authenticate against the device itself or against other devices sharing the same credentials, allowing the attacker to access and tamper with the device's data and to disrupt its operations. | ||||
| CVE-2026-33388 | 1 Nozomi Networks | 2 Cmc, Guardian | 2026-10-15 | 7.4 High |
| An access control vulnerability was discovered in the Credentials Manager functionality due to insufficient validation of user privileges. A remote authenticated user with limited privileges can view a limited subset of the available entries in the Credentials Manager. The actual credential values are not directly visible, but the user can delete entries or edit their properties. An attacker who deletes or edits an entry can disrupt authentication for dependent devices, and one who manipulates an entry's configuration may be able to indirectly obtain the credentials. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31768 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: adc: ti-adc161s626: use DMA-safe memory for spi_read() Add a DMA-safe buffer and use it for spi_read() instead of a stack memory. All SPI buffers must be DMA-safe. Since we only need up to 3 bytes, we just use a u8[] instead of __be16 and __be32 and change the conversion functions appropriately. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31761 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: gyro: mpu3050: Move iio_device_register() to correct location iio_device_register() should be at the end of the probe function to prevent race conditions. Place iio_device_register() at the end of the probe function and place iio_device_unregister() accordingly. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31712 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 8.3 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: require minimum ACE size in smb_check_perm_dacl() Both ACE-walk loops in smb_check_perm_dacl() only guard against an under-sized remaining buffer, not against an ACE whose declared `ace->size` is smaller than the struct it claims to describe: if (offsetof(struct smb_ace, access_req) > aces_size) break; ace_size = le16_to_cpu(ace->size); if (ace_size > aces_size) break; The first check only requires the 4-byte ACE header to be in bounds; it does not require access_req (4 bytes at offset 4) to be readable. An attacker who has set a crafted DACL on a file they own can declare ace->size == 4 with aces_size == 4, pass both checks, and then granted |= le32_to_cpu(ace->access_req); /* upper loop */ compare_sids(&sid, &ace->sid); /* lower loop */ reads access_req at offset 4 (OOB by up to 4 bytes) and ace->sid at offset 8 (OOB by up to CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE + SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES * 4 bytes). Tighten both loops to require ace_size >= offsetof(struct smb_ace, sid) + CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE which is the smallest valid on-wire ACE layout (4-byte header + 4-byte access_req + 8-byte sid base with zero sub-auths). Also reject ACEs whose sid.num_subauth exceeds SID_MAX_SUB_AUTHORITIES before letting compare_sids() dereference sub_auth[] entries. parse_sec_desc() already enforces an equivalent check (lines 441-448); smb_check_perm_dacl() simply grew weaker validation over time. Reachability: authenticated SMB client with permission to set an ACL on a file. On a subsequent CREATE against that file, the kernel walks the stored DACL via smb_check_perm_dacl() and triggers the OOB read. Not pre-auth, and the OOB read is not reflected to the attacker, but KASAN reports and kernel state corruption are possible. | ||||
| CVE-2026-31711 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-10-15 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: server: fix active_num_conn leak on transport allocation failure Commit 77ffbcac4e56 ("smb: server: fix leak of active_num_conn in ksmbd_tcp_new_connection()") addressed the kthread_run() failure path. The earlier alloc_transport() == NULL path in the same function has the same leak, is reachable pre-authentication via any TCP connect to port 445, and was empirically reproduced on UML (ARCH=um, v7.0-rc7): a small number of forced allocation failures were sufficient to put ksmbd into a state where every subsequent connection attempt was rejected for the remainder of the boot. ksmbd_kthread_fn() increments active_num_conn before calling ksmbd_tcp_new_connection() and discards the return value, so when alloc_transport() returns NULL the socket is released and -ENOMEM returned without decrementing the counter. Each such failure permanently consumes one slot from the max_connections pool; once cumulative failures reach the cap, atomic_inc_return() hits the threshold on every subsequent accept and every new connection is rejected. The counter is only reset by module reload. An unauthenticated remote attacker can drive the server toward the memory pressure that makes alloc_transport() fail by holding open connections with large RFC1002 lengths up to MAX_STREAM_PROT_LEN (0x00FFFFFF); natural transient allocation failures on a loaded host produce the same drift more slowly. Mirror the existing rollback pattern in ksmbd_kthread_fn(): on the alloc_transport() failure path, decrement active_num_conn gated on server_conf.max_connections. Repro details: with the patch reverted, forced alloc_transport() NULL returns leaked counter slots and subsequent connection attempts -- including legitimate connects issued after the forced-fail window had closed -- were all rejected with "Limit the maximum number of connections". With this patch applied, the same connect sequence produces no rejections and the counter cycles cleanly between zero and one on every accept. | ||||