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Search Results (26248 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-74607 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-25 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: SVM: Serialize accesses to the owner and mirror list with separate lock Interaction between KVM_CAP_VM_MOVE_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM and KVM_CAP_VM_COPY_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM can cause two separate issues: - in sev_migrate_from(), when the destination KVM is a mirror, the mirror entry is moved from the source's list to the owner's mirror_vms list, without holding the owner's lock unlike other writers of the owner's mirror list (sev_vm_copy_enc_context_from(), sev_vm_destroy()). A concurrent COPY or destroy can race with sev_migrate_from() and corrupt the list. - In sev_vm_destroy(), the *owner* is still active and could receive concurrently a KVM_CAP_VM_MOVE_ENC_CONTEXT_FROM that causes sev->enc_context_owner to change. In this case the incorrect VM receives kvm_put_kvm(). The second issue needs particular care because the owner could disappear altogether (even though the race window is impossibly small) between reading it and locking it. There is thus no way to perform the checks under the owner lock without putting struct kvm under SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU (which would allow kvm_get_kvm_safe() under RCU critical section). It is much simpler to just use a global lock, since the critical sections are so small and the new lock is always a leaf lock. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74606 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-25 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: eventfs: Fix use-after-free in eventfs_remove_rec() eventfs_remove_rec() recursively removes the child at the current loop position. After the recursive call returns, list_for_each_entry() advances by reading list.next from the removed child. If free_ei() drops the final reference, release_ei() reuses the list/rcu union to queue an SRCU callback. The child may be freed before that read. The eventfs_mutex serializes list updates, but it does not keep the removed child alive or prevent the SRCU callback from running. Use list_for_each_entry_safe() to save the next sibling before recursively removing the current child. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74595 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-25 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fscrypt: use the mount idmap for the owner check in fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy() fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy() calls inode_owner_or_capable() with &nop_mnt_idmap before allowing an encryption policy to be set, instead of the idmap of the mount the ioctl was issued on. fscrypt is used by filesystems that support idmapped mounts (e.g. ext4, f2fs), so on such a mount this compares the caller's fsuid against the unmapped on-disk owner rather than the mapped owner: the actual owner can be wrongly denied with -EACCES and an unrelated caller wrongly allowed. Use file_mnt_idmap(filp) instead. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74591 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-25 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/filemap: __filemap_add_folio() restore index before retrying In __filemap_add_folio()'s split-a-conflict loop, xas_set_order() is applied repeatedly: each application modifies xas.xa_index, rounding it down according to the split_order attempted at that stage: and if all goes as intended, it eventually (or immediately) converges on an xas_try_split() to the required folio_order, with xas.xa_index now the same as index: then xas_store() puts the new folio into the xarray there. But if a new node was needed, and GFP_NOWAIT allocation did not get one, the lock is dropped, xas_nomem() used to allocate, and sequence retried. If (that part of) the xarray is unchanged when the lock is reacquired, no problem. But what if the conflict was meanwhile resolved by another thread (perhaps even doing the same thing, inserting a folio at that same index)? Isn't there a danger of now putting our folio into the xarray at an intermediate rounded-down index? With !folio_contains() bug to follow, when CONFIG_DEBUG_VM=y is checking for that. Fix this with an xas_set_order() to restore the original xas.xa_index at the bottom of the loop, so the retry does a full re-evaluation after reacquiring the lock, and cannot reach xas_store() with the wrong index. Production was suffering from rare SIGILLs and SIGSEGVs, executable text found a page away from where it belonged, !folio_contains() bug hit when debug enabled: symptoms not seen since this patch went in. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74588 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-25 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: keep chunk->transport in step with the list it is queued on __sctp_outq_flush_rtx() moves a gap-acked chunk onto another transport's transmitted list without updating chunk->transport: if (chunk->tsn_gap_acked) { list_move_tail(&chunk->transmitted_list, &transport->transmitted); continue; } The chunk then sits on a live transport's list while chunk->transport still names a different one. If that transport is removed - sctp_assoc_rm_peer() from an ASCONF Delete-IP - sctp_transport_free() RCU-frees it and the chunk is left with a dangling pointer. sctp_assoc_rm_peer() scrubs peer->transmitted and asoc->outqueue.out_chunk_list, but the chunk is on neither. The pointer is not followed while tsn_gap_acked is set. A SACK that reneges on the TSN clears the flag, and the next SACK reaches tchunk->transport->flight_size -= sctp_data_size(tchunk); inside the freed transport. KASAN reports a slab-use-after-free read in sctp_check_transmitted(), freed from sctp_assoc_rm_peer(). Both the removal and the SACKs come from the association peer. Set chunk->transport at the move. The ordinary resend path needs nothing: it reaches its list_move_tail() only after sctp_packet_append_chunk() returned SCTP_XMIT_OK, and __sctp_packet_append_chunk() has rebound the chunk by then. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com> | ||||
| CVE-2026-74584 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-25 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/bnxt_re: zero shared page before exposing to userspace bnxt_re_alloc_ucontext() allocates uctx->shpg via __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL). The buddy allocator does not zero pages without __GFP_ZERO, so the page contains stale kernel data from whatever object most recently freed it. The page is then mapped into userspace via vm_insert_page() under BNXT_RE_MMAP_SH_PAGE in bnxt_re_mmap(). The driver only ever writes 4 bytes (a u32 AVID) at offset BNXT_RE_AVID_OFFT (0x10) inside bnxt_re_create_ah(); the remaining 4092 bytes of the page are exposed to userspace unsanitised, leaking kernel memory contents. Any user with access to /dev/infiniband/uverbsX on a host with a bnxt_re device (typically rdma group membership) can read this data via a single mmap() at pgoff 0 after IB_USER_VERBS_CMD_GET_CONTEXT. Other shared pages in the same file already use get_zeroed_page() correctly: drivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c srq->uctx_srq_page = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); cq->uctx_cq_page = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); uctx->shpg is the only outlier. Bring it in line with the existing convention by switching to get_zeroed_page(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-74583 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-25 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: cls_route: fix fastmap use-after-free on filter The route4 classifier maintains a 16-slot fastmap cache that stores raw struct route4_filter pointers indexed by (id, iif). The reader (route4_classify) populates this cache via route4_set_fastmap() for every classified packet that hits a filter. The writer (route4_delete, route4_change) clears the cache via route4_reset_fastmap() before RCU-deferred kfree of the filter. This creates a UAF race: 1. Reader walks the RCU-protected bucket chain, finds filter f 2. Writer unlinks f, calls route4_reset_fastmap(), then tcf_queue_work() 3. Reader calls route4_set_fastmap() and writes f into the cache *after* the writer's reset, caching a pointer about to be freed 4. After the RCU grace period, kfree(f) executes 5. Next classified packet on the same (id, iif) tuple hits the stale fastmap entry and reads f->res from freed memory Reproduced with an mdelay(100) accelerator in route4_set_fastmap() and a concurrent add/delete stress test (provided by both zdi and Santosh). Both triggered KASAN slab-use-after-free reports in the route4 fastmap paths. Fix: Introduce a per-filter boolean dying flag to suppress stale fastmap republishing by in-flight readers. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74579 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-25 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nft_payload: fix mask build for partial field offload nft_payload_offload_mask() builds the offload match mask for a payload expression that covers only part of a header field. For a partial IPv6 address match (field_len = 16, priv_len = 1) that shift is 1 << 120, which is undefined on the 32-bit int operand. It also trims only one word, so the remaining words stay 0xffffffff (and when priv_len is a multiple of 4 the trim is skipped entirely), leaving the mask covering more bytes than the rule matches. UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in net/netfilter/nft_payload.c:278:20 shift exponent 120 is too large for 32-bit type 'int' ... The match is byte-granular and struct nft_data is zero-initialised, so the correct mask is simply the first priv_len bytes set to 0xff. Set those bytes directly and drop the word/shift trimming; this removes the undefined shift and no longer over-masks the trailing bytes. | ||||
| CVE-2026-24208 | 2 Linux, Nvidia | 2 Linux Kernel, Triton Inference Server | 2026-08-24 | 5.3 Medium |
| NVIDIA Triton Inference Server contains a vulnerability where an attacker could cause a path traversal issue. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to denial of service. | ||||
| CVE-2021-21009 | 3 Adobe, Linux, Microsoft | 3 Campaign, Linux Kernel, Windows | 2026-08-24 | 8.6 High |
| Adobe Campaign Classic Gold Standard 10 (and earlier), 20.3.1 (and earlier), 20.2.3 (and earlier), 20.1.3 (and earlier), 19.2.3 (and earlier) and 19.1.7 (and earlier) are affected by a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. Successful exploitation could allow an attacker to use the Campaign instance to issue unauthorized requests to internal or external resources. | ||||
| CVE-2020-9666 | 3 Adobe, Linux, Microsoft | 3 Campaign, Linux Kernel, Windows | 2026-08-24 | 5.5 Medium |
| Adobe Campaign Classic before 20.2 have an out-of-bounds read vulnerability. Successful exploitation could lead to information disclosure. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74677 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-24 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: usb: ipheth: fix carrier_work UAF on disconnect ipheth_sndbulk_callback() re-arms the carrier-check work on any non-zero URB status: else schedule_delayed_work(&dev->carrier_work, 0); Nothing ties that to the interface being up, so the work can be armed again after ipheth_close() has already drained it, and stay armed until the netdev whose private area embeds it is freed. On unplug with a TX URB in flight, ipheth_disconnect() drains the work through unregister_netdev() -> ipheth_close() -> cancel_delayed_work_sync() and only then calls ipheth_kill_urbs(). usb_kill_urb() completes the in-flight TX URB with -ENOENT, so ipheth_sndbulk_callback() runs after the drain and re-arms carrier_work. The same completion also re-arms the work if the interface is only brought down while a TX URB is in flight, and ipheth_carrier_check_work() then keeps re-queueing itself once a second. unregister_netdev() does not call ipheth_close() for an already-down interface, so nothing drains it on the later unplug either. In both cases free_netdev() frees the netdev while carrier_work is still pending, and ipheth_carrier_check_work() dereferences freed memory. Tie the work to the interface state instead of chasing the completion: disable it in ipheth_close() and enable it in ipheth_open(), so a schedule_delayed_work() from the URB completion is a no-op whenever the interface is not up. disable_delayed_work_sync() also waits for a running instance, so it fully replaces the cancel_delayed_work_sync() it takes the place of. The work starts out disabled in ipheth_probe() so the enable/disable counts balance from the first open. Reproduced under KASAN on linux-next (next-20260731) with dummy_hcd and raw-gadget standing in for the device, driving the second path above (the interface is already down, so unregister_netdev() does not call ipheth_close()): 15 of 15 unpatched boots report a slab-use-after-free in __run_timers(), freed by ipheth_disconnect() and re-armed from ipheth_sndbulk_callback() via queue_delayed_work_on(). The same trigger on a kernel differing only by this patch reports 0 of 15, and the carrier check still functions across open/close cycles. The reproducer needs an attached USB device that stops draining bulk OUT, plus a link down and unplug, driven as root. It is not a privilege boundary crossing and no exploit primitive was developed. Found by 0sec (https://0sec.ai). | ||||
| CVE-2026-74638 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-24 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/v3d: Serialize the scheduler timeout handlers V3D exposes several independent hardware queues (BIN, RENDER, TFU and CSD) but has only a single, global reset. A timeout on any one queue therefore has to stop, reset and restart the schedulers of every other queue as well. That makes concurrent timeout handlers unsafe. `reset_lock` was never able to make them safe, as a driver-side lock can only cover the driver's &drm_sched_backend_ops.timedout_job callback. The scheduler handles the timed out job and its pending list around that callback, outside of the driver's control, so a global reset triggered by one queue can still interfere with another queue that is in the middle of handling a timeout of its own. Consequently, if a reset happens in the CSD queue while a CL-intensive application is running, the global reset stops and restarts the CL queue's scheduler while that queue is handling a timeout of its own. As drm_sched_stop() and drm_sched_start() subtract and add the credits of every job sitting on the pending list of the scheduler they are called on, and as the CL queue's handler concurrently takes its job off that same list and puts it back, the stop and the start no longer see the same set of jobs. The CL queue is left with more credits in flight than its limit: [ 327.302739] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 327.302744] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 43 at drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_main.c:102 drm_sched_run_job_work+0x238/0x4d0 [gpu_sched] [ 327.302884] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 43 Comm: kworker/u16:1 Not tainted 6.18.39-v8-16k+ #3 PREEMPT [ 327.302889] Hardware name: Raspberry Pi 5 Model B Rev 1.0 (DT) [ 327.302893] Workqueue: v3d_bin drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched] [ 327.302984] Call trace: [ 327.302987] drm_sched_run_job_work+0x238/0x4d0 [gpu_sched] (P) [ 327.302997] process_scheduled_works+0x180/0x3d0 [ 327.303010] worker_thread+0x268/0x3e8 [ 327.303016] kthread+0x140/0x250 [ 327.303022] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 327.303031] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- From that point on, the credit count of the CL queue is broken, causing a complete GPU hang and UI freeze. The DRM scheduler already provides a mechanism to serialize the timeout handlers of different schedulers: an ordered workqueue passed as drm_sched_init()'s @timeout_wq parameter. By default, each scheduler queues its timeout work on the system workqueue, which runs the handlers concurrently. Give all of the queues a shared ordered workqueue instead, as recommended by the DRM scheduler documentation for hardware that has distinct queues but resets globally. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74575 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-23 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: thunderbolt: Prevent XDomain delayed work use-after-free on disconnect tb_xdp_handle_request() runs on system_wq and queues xd->state_work via queue_delayed_work() in three request handlers: PROPERTIES_CHANGED_REQUEST, UUID_REQUEST (via start_handshake), and LINK_STATE_CHANGE_REQUEST. Similarly, update_xdomain() queues xd->properties_changed_work when local properties change. Concurrently, tb_xdomain_remove() calls stop_handshake() which does cancel_delayed_work_sync() on both delayed works. Later, tb_xdomain_unregister() calls device_unregister() which eventually frees the xdomain. Since commit 559c1e1e0134 ("thunderbolt: Run tb_xdp_handle_request() in system workqueue") moved the request handler off tb->wq, the handler and the remove path are no longer serialized. If queue_delayed_work() executes after cancel_delayed_work_sync() but before the xdomain is freed, the delayed work fires on a freed object. Add xd->removing that tb_xdomain_remove() sets under xd->lock before calling stop_handshake(). Each external queue site holds the same lock and checks removing before calling queue_delayed_work(). This provides the mutual exclusion needed: either the queue site acquires the lock first and queues work that the subsequent cancel will see, or the remove path acquires the lock first and the queue site observes removing == true and skips the queue. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74514 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-23 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: s390: pci: Fix memory accounting for pinned/unpinned pages The account_mem() and unaccount_mem() functions call get_uid() which increments the reference count of struct user_struct on every invocation. But we don't decrement the count by calling free_uid(). It also accounted/unaccounted the pages against the current->mm. But its possible the unaccount_mem() can be called from a different process context than the one that originally pinned the pages. Let's fix this by storing the pinning process user_struct and mm_struct when accounting for pinned pages, and subsequently free these resources when the pages are unpinned. [borntraeger@linux.ibm.com: Fixed whitespace] | ||||
| CVE-2026-74508 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-23 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: HIDP: reject frames without a transaction header hidp_recv_ctrl_frame() and hidp_recv_intr_frame() read skb->data[0] before checking that the L2CAP SDU contains a transaction header. A connected HIDP peer can send an empty basic-mode SDU and make both paths use an uninitialized byte from skb tailroom. KMSAN reports the use in hidp_session_run(), with the uninitialized value originating in __alloc_skb() through vhci_write(). The control path produces two reports and the interrupt path produces one. The byte can also be controlled by a malformed lower-layer packet. If an HCI ACL packet contains an L2CAP PDU with a declared zero-length payload followed by an extra 0x15 byte, l2cap_recv_acldata() reduces skb->len to the declared PDU length before dispatch. The current HIDP path nevertheless consumes the extra byte as HIDP_TRANS_HID_CONTROL | HIDP_CTRL_VIRTUAL_CABLE_UNPLUG and terminates the HIDP session. With this change, the same packet is discarded and a subsequent feature report request succeeds. Pull the transaction header with skb_pull_data() and discard frames that do not contain it. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74494 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-23 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: reject repeated SMB2 NEGOTIATE requests Unauthenticated client can send multiple successful SMB2 NEGOTIATE requests on one connection before SESSION_SETUP. While the connection is in KSMBD_SESS_NEED_SETUP, smb2_handle_negotiate() accepts another SMB3.1.1 NEGOTIATE and overwrites conn->preauth_info with a new allocation. Only the final allocation is freed when the connection is released, leaking one object for every additional successful request. A repeated SMB2 NEGOTIATE after a dialect has been selected is a protocol violation. MS-SMB2 section 3.3.5.4 requires the server to disconnect without replying in this case. Set the connection exiting when rejecting the request, in addition to suppressing the response. Reject SMB2 NEGOTIATE unless the connection is new or is waiting for the SMB2 NEGOTIATE that follows an SMB1 multi-protocol negotiate. Serialize both SMB1 and SMB2 negotiation paths under conn->srv_mutex, since they update connection-wide dialect and negotiation state. Move the locking contract to ksmbd_smb_negotiate_common(), where the state and dialect are selected, and add ksmbd_conn_new() for consistent state access. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74483 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-23 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: binfmt_misc: don't leak the user namespace when the mount fails bm_get_tree() takes a reference to the user namespace and hands it to get_tree_keyed() as the sget key. sget_fc() moves that reference into sb->s_fs_info and clears fc->s_fs_info, so from that point on the superblock owns it and bm_free() doesn't see it anymore. The superblock drops it in ->put_super(). But generic_shutdown_super() only calls ->put_super() from inside the if (sb->s_root) branch, so nothing releases it when bm_fill_super() fails: - The kzalloc_obj() failure leaves s_root NULL and the whole branch is skipped. - A simple_fill_super() failure in the file loop leaves s_root set, but s_op still points at simple_super_operations, which has no ->put_super(). bm_fill_super() installs s_ops only once simple_fill_super() returned success, and installing it earlier wouldn't help either because simple_fill_super() overwrites s_op. Either way vfs_get_super() calls deactivate_locked_super() and the reference is gone for good. binfmt_misc mounts are available in a user namespace and both the inode and the dentry cache are SLAB_ACCOUNT, so an unprivileged caller under a tight memory cgroup can fail simple_fill_super() on demand and leak one user namespace per attempt. Drop the reference in ->kill_sb() instead, which runs unconditionally, the same way nfsd and rpc_pipefs release their keyed s_fs_info. That also stops ->put_super() from clearing s_fs_info while the superblock is still on @fs_supers. generic_shutdown_super() leaves it there on purpose so that sget_fc() keeps finding it until kill_sb() has run, but a NULL s_fs_info makes test_keyed_super() miss it, so a concurrent mount for the same user namespace skips the grab_super() wait and creates a second superblock for a namespace that is still being torn down. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74441 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-23 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: ucsi: Fix race condition and ordering in port unregistration A synchronization issue exists during port unregistration where pending partner work items can race against workqueue destruction, leading to use-after-free conditions: cros_ec_ucsi cros_ec_ucsi.3.auto: error -ETIMEDOUT: PPM init failed BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 RIP: 0010:__queue_work+0x83/0x4a0 Call Trace: <IRQ> __cfi_delayed_work_timer_fn+0x10/0x10 run_timer_softirq+0x3b6/0xbd0 sched_clock_cpu+0xc/0x110 irq_exit_rcu+0x18d/0x330 fred_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x5e/0x80 Fix this by ensuring strict ordering and proper serialization during teardown: 1. Move ucsi_unregister_partner() to the beginning of the teardown sequence and protect it under the connector mutex lock. 2. Ensure all pending partner tasks are explicitly flushed and finished before the workqueue is destroyed. 3. Switch from mod_delayed_work() to a cancel_delayed_work() and queue_delayed_work() sequence. This guarantees that items currently marked as pending won't be scheduled an additional time, preventing a double release of resources which leads to the following crash: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead000000000122: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI Workqueue: cros_ec_ucsi.3.auto-con2 ucsi_poll_worker RIP: 0010:ucsi_poll_worker+0x65/0x1e0 Call Trace: <TASK> process_scheduled_works+0x218/0x6d0 worker_thread+0x188/0x3f0 __cfi_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x226/0x2a0 To ensure these rules are applied identically across both the normal teardown and the ucsi_init() error paths, consolidate the cleanup logic into a new helper, ucsi_unregister_port(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-72308 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-23 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mlxsw: fix refcount leak in mlxsw_sp_port_lag_join() When mlxsw_sp_port_lag_index_get() fails, mlxsw_sp_port_lag_join() returns an error without releasing the lag reference obtained by the earlier mlxsw_sp_lag_get(). All other error paths in the function jump to the cleanup label that ends with mlxsw_sp_lag_put(), so this is a single missed release. Fix the leak by replacing the bare 'return err' with a goto to the existing error cleanup label, which will drop the reference safely. | ||||