| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: add proper RCU protection to /proc/net/ptype
Yin Fengwei reported an RCU stall in ptype_seq_show() and provided
a patch.
Real issue is that ptype_seq_next() and ptype_seq_show() violate
RCU rules.
ptype_seq_show() runs under rcu_read_lock(), and reads pt->dev
to get device name without any barrier.
At the same time, concurrent writers can remove a packet_type structure
(which is correctly freed after an RCU grace period) and clear pt->dev
without an RCU grace period.
Define ptype_iter_state to carry a dev pointer along seq_net_private:
struct ptype_iter_state {
struct seq_net_private p;
struct net_device *dev; // added in this patch
};
We need to record the device pointer in ptype_get_idx() and
ptype_seq_next() so that ptype_seq_show() is safe against
concurrent pt->dev changes.
We also need to add full RCU protection in ptype_seq_next().
(Missing READ_ONCE() when reading list.next values)
Many thanks to Dong Chenchen for providing a repro. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: fix use-after-free in nf_tables_addchain()
nf_tables_addchain() publishes the chain to table->chains via
list_add_tail_rcu() (in nft_chain_add()) before registering hooks.
If nf_tables_register_hook() then fails, the error path calls
nft_chain_del() (list_del_rcu()) followed by nf_tables_chain_destroy()
with no RCU grace period in between.
This creates two use-after-free conditions:
1) Control-plane: nf_tables_dump_chains() traverses table->chains
under rcu_read_lock(). A concurrent dump can still be walking
the chain when the error path frees it.
2) Packet path: for NFPROTO_INET, nf_register_net_hook() briefly
installs the IPv4 hook before IPv6 registration fails. Packets
entering nft_do_chain() via the transient IPv4 hook can still be
dereferencing chain->blob_gen_X when the error path frees the
chain.
Add synchronize_rcu() between nft_chain_del() and the chain destroy
so that all RCU readers -- both dump threads and in-flight packet
evaluation -- have finished before the chain is freed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: fix inverted genmask check in nft_map_catchall_activate()
nft_map_catchall_activate() has an inverted element activity check
compared to its non-catchall counterpart nft_mapelem_activate() and
compared to what is logically required.
nft_map_catchall_activate() is called from the abort path to re-activate
catchall map elements that were deactivated during a failed transaction.
It should skip elements that are already active (they don't need
re-activation) and process elements that are inactive (they need to be
restored). Instead, the current code does the opposite: it skips inactive
elements and processes active ones.
Compare the non-catchall activate callback, which is correct:
nft_mapelem_activate():
if (nft_set_elem_active(ext, iter->genmask))
return 0; /* skip active, process inactive */
With the buggy catchall version:
nft_map_catchall_activate():
if (!nft_set_elem_active(ext, genmask))
continue; /* skip inactive, process active */
The consequence is that when a DELSET operation is aborted,
nft_setelem_data_activate() is never called for the catchall element.
For NFT_GOTO verdict elements, this means nft_data_hold() is never
called to restore the chain->use reference count. Each abort cycle
permanently decrements chain->use. Once chain->use reaches zero,
DELCHAIN succeeds and frees the chain while catchall verdict elements
still reference it, resulting in a use-after-free.
This is exploitable for local privilege escalation from an unprivileged
user via user namespaces + nftables on distributions that enable
CONFIG_USER_NS and CONFIG_NF_TABLES.
Fix by removing the negation so the check matches nft_mapelem_activate():
skip active elements, process inactive ones. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: Fix use-after-free in inet6_addr_del().
syzbot reported use-after-free of inet6_ifaddr in
inet6_addr_del(). [0]
The cited commit accidentally moved ipv6_del_addr() for
mngtmpaddr before reading its ifp->flags for temporary
addresses in inet6_addr_del().
Let's move ipv6_del_addr() down to fix the UAF.
[0]:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in inet6_addr_del.constprop.0+0x67a/0x6b0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3117
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88807b89c86c by task syz.3.1618/9593
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9593 Comm: syz.3.1618 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/25/2025
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0xcd/0x630 mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:595
inet6_addr_del.constprop.0+0x67a/0x6b0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3117
addrconf_del_ifaddr+0x11e/0x190 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3181
inet6_ioctl+0x1e5/0x2b0 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:582
sock_do_ioctl+0x118/0x280 net/socket.c:1254
sock_ioctl+0x227/0x6b0 net/socket.c:1375
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:583
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f164cf8f749
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f164de64038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f164d1e5fa0 RCX: 00007f164cf8f749
RDX: 0000200000000000 RSI: 0000000000008936 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f164d013f91 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007f164d1e6038 R14: 00007f164d1e5fa0 R15: 00007ffde15c8288
</TASK>
Allocated by task 9593:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:56
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:77
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:397 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:414
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:957 [inline]
kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1094 [inline]
ipv6_add_addr+0x4e3/0x2010 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:1120
inet6_addr_add+0x256/0x9b0 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3050
addrconf_add_ifaddr+0x1fc/0x450 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3160
inet6_ioctl+0x103/0x2b0 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:580
sock_do_ioctl+0x118/0x280 net/socket.c:1254
sock_ioctl+0x227/0x6b0 net/socket.c:1375
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:583 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:583
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcd/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 6099:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:56
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:77
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 mm/kasan/generic.c:584
poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:252 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:284
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:234 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2540 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:2569 [inline]
slab_free_bulk mm/slub.c:6696 [inline]
kmem_cache_free_bulk mm/slub.c:7383 [inline]
kmem_cache_free_bulk+0x2bf/0x680 mm/slub.c:7362
kfree_bulk include/linux/slab.h:830 [inline]
kvfree_rcu_bulk+0x1b7/0x1e0 mm/slab_common.c:1523
kvfree_rcu_drain_ready mm/slab_common.c:1728 [inline]
kfree_rcu_monitor+0x1d0/0x2f0 mm/slab_common.c:1801
process_one_work+0x9ba/0x1b20 kernel/workqueue.c:3257
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqu
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: tegra-adma: Fix use-after-free
A use-after-free bug exists in the Tegra ADMA driver when audio streams
are terminated, particularly during XRUN conditions. The issue occurs
when the DMA buffer is freed by tegra_adma_terminate_all() before the
vchan completion tasklet finishes accessing it.
The race condition follows this sequence:
1. DMA transfer completes, triggering an interrupt that schedules the
completion tasklet (tasklet has not executed yet)
2. Audio playback stops, calling tegra_adma_terminate_all() which
frees the DMA buffer memory via kfree()
3. The scheduled tasklet finally executes, calling vchan_complete()
which attempts to access the already-freed memory
Since tasklets can execute at any time after being scheduled, there is
no guarantee that the buffer will remain valid when vchan_complete()
runs.
Fix this by properly synchronizing the virtual channel completion:
- Calling vchan_terminate_vdesc() in tegra_adma_stop() to mark the
descriptors as terminated instead of freeing the descriptor.
- Add the callback tegra_adma_synchronize() that calls
vchan_synchronize() which kills any pending tasklets and frees any
terminated descriptors.
Crash logs:
[ 337.427523] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vchan_complete+0x124/0x3b0
[ 337.427544] Read of size 8 at addr ffff000132055428 by task swapper/0/0
[ 337.427562] Call trace:
[ 337.427564] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x320
[ 337.427571] show_stack+0x20/0x30
[ 337.427575] dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84
[ 337.427584] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x74/0x2b8
[ 337.427590] kasan_report+0x1f4/0x210
[ 337.427598] __asan_load8+0xa0/0xd0
[ 337.427603] vchan_complete+0x124/0x3b0
[ 337.427609] tasklet_action_common.constprop.0+0x190/0x1d0
[ 337.427617] tasklet_action+0x30/0x40
[ 337.427623] __do_softirq+0x1a0/0x5c4
[ 337.427628] irq_exit+0x110/0x140
[ 337.427633] handle_domain_irq+0xa4/0xe0
[ 337.427640] gic_handle_irq+0x64/0x160
[ 337.427644] call_on_irq_stack+0x20/0x4c
[ 337.427649] do_interrupt_handler+0x7c/0x90
[ 337.427654] el1_interrupt+0x30/0x80
[ 337.427659] el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x30
[ 337.427663] el1h_64_irq+0x7c/0x80
[ 337.427667] cpuidle_enter_state+0xe4/0x540
[ 337.427674] cpuidle_enter+0x54/0x80
[ 337.427679] do_idle+0x2e0/0x380
[ 337.427685] cpu_startup_entry+0x2c/0x70
[ 337.427690] rest_init+0x114/0x130
[ 337.427695] arch_call_rest_init+0x18/0x24
[ 337.427702] start_kernel+0x380/0x3b4
[ 337.427706] __primary_switched+0xc0/0xc8 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: aic94xx: fix use-after-free in device removal path
The asd_pci_remove() function fails to synchronize with pending tasklets
before freeing the asd_ha structure, leading to a potential
use-after-free vulnerability.
When a device removal is triggered (via hot-unplug or module unload),
race condition can occur.
The fix adds tasklet_kill() before freeing the asd_ha structure,
ensuring all scheduled tasklets complete before cleanup proceeds. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme: fix admin request_queue lifetime
The namespaces can access the controller's admin request_queue, and
stale references on the namespaces may exist after tearing down the
controller. Ensure the admin request_queue is active by moving the
controller's 'put' to after all controller references have been released
to ensure no one is can access the request_queue. This fixes a reported
use-after-free bug:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in blk_queue_enter+0x41c/0x4a0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88c0a53819f8 by task nvme/3287
CPU: 67 UID: 0 PID: 3287 Comm: nvme Tainted: G E 6.13.2-ga1582f1a031e #15
Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: Jabil /EGS 2S MB1, BIOS 1.00 06/18/2025
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x4f/0x60
print_report+0xc4/0x620
? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x70/0xb0
? _raw_read_unlock_irqrestore+0x30/0x30
? blk_queue_enter+0x41c/0x4a0
kasan_report+0xab/0xe0
? blk_queue_enter+0x41c/0x4a0
blk_queue_enter+0x41c/0x4a0
? __irq_work_queue_local+0x75/0x1d0
? blk_queue_start_drain+0x70/0x70
? irq_work_queue+0x18/0x20
? vprintk_emit.part.0+0x1cc/0x350
? wake_up_klogd_work_func+0x60/0x60
blk_mq_alloc_request+0x2b7/0x6b0
? __blk_mq_alloc_requests+0x1060/0x1060
? __switch_to+0x5b7/0x1060
nvme_submit_user_cmd+0xa9/0x330
nvme_user_cmd.isra.0+0x240/0x3f0
? force_sigsegv+0xe0/0xe0
? nvme_user_cmd64+0x400/0x400
? vfs_fileattr_set+0x9b0/0x9b0
? cgroup_update_frozen_flag+0x24/0x1c0
? cgroup_leave_frozen+0x204/0x330
? nvme_ioctl+0x7c/0x2c0
blkdev_ioctl+0x1a8/0x4d0
? blkdev_common_ioctl+0x1930/0x1930
? fdget+0x54/0x380
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x129/0x190
do_syscall_64+0x5b/0x160
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
RIP: 0033:0x7f765f703b0b
Code: ff ff ff 85 c0 79 9b 49 c7 c4 ff ff ff ff 5b 5d 4c 89 e0 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d dd 52 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffe2cefe808 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe2cefe860 RCX: 00007f765f703b0b
RDX: 00007ffe2cefe860 RSI: 00000000c0484e41 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00007f765f611d50 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000003
R13: 00000000c0484e41 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 00007ffe2cefea60
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: idxd: Remove improper idxd_free
The call to idxd_free() introduces a duplicate put_device() leading to a
reference count underflow:
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 15 PID: 4428 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate+0xbe/0x110
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
idxd_remove+0xe4/0x120 [idxd]
pci_device_remove+0x3f/0xb0
device_release_driver_internal+0x197/0x200
driver_detach+0x48/0x90
bus_remove_driver+0x74/0xf0
pci_unregister_driver+0x2e/0xb0
idxd_exit_module+0x34/0x7a0 [idxd]
__do_sys_delete_module.constprop.0+0x183/0x280
do_syscall_64+0x54/0xd70
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
The idxd_unregister_devices() which is invoked at the very beginning of
idxd_remove(), already takes care of the necessary put_device() through the
following call path:
idxd_unregister_devices() -> device_unregister() -> put_device()
In addition, when CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT_RELEASE is enabled, put_device() may
trigger asynchronous cleanup via schedule_delayed_work(). If idxd_free() is
called immediately after, it can result in a use-after-free.
Remove the improper idxd_free() to avoid both the refcount underflow and
potential memory corruption during module unload. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: writeback: fix use-after-free in __mark_inode_dirty()
An use-after-free issue occurred when __mark_inode_dirty() get the
bdi_writeback that was in the progress of switching.
CPU: 1 PID: 562 Comm: systemd-random- Not tainted 6.6.56-gb4403bd46a8e #1
......
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : __mark_inode_dirty+0x124/0x418
lr : __mark_inode_dirty+0x118/0x418
sp : ffffffc08c9dbbc0
........
Call trace:
__mark_inode_dirty+0x124/0x418
generic_update_time+0x4c/0x60
file_modified+0xcc/0xd0
ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x58/0x124
ext4_file_write_iter+0x54/0x704
vfs_write+0x1c0/0x308
ksys_write+0x74/0x10c
__arm64_sys_write+0x1c/0x28
invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xc0/0xe0
do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
el0_svc+0x40/0xe4
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x12c
el0t_64_sync+0x194/0x198
Root cause is:
systemd-random-seed kworker
----------------------------------------------------------------------
___mark_inode_dirty inode_switch_wbs_work_fn
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
inode_attach_wb
locked_inode_to_wb_and_lock_list
get inode->i_wb
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
spin_lock(&wb->list_lock)
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock)
inode_io_list_move_locked
spin_unlock(&wb->list_lock)
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock)
spin_lock(&old_wb->list_lock)
inode_do_switch_wbs
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock)
inode->i_wb = new_wb
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock)
spin_unlock(&old_wb->list_lock)
wb_put_many(old_wb, nr_switched)
cgwb_release
old wb released
wb_wakeup_delayed() accesses wb,
then trigger the use-after-free
issue
Fix this race condition by holding inode spinlock until
wb_wakeup_delayed() finished. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: brcmfmac: fix use-after-free when rescheduling brcmf_btcoex_info work
The brcmf_btcoex_detach() only shuts down the btcoex timer, if the
flag timer_on is false. However, the brcmf_btcoex_timerfunc(), which
runs as timer handler, sets timer_on to false. This creates critical
race conditions:
1.If brcmf_btcoex_detach() is called while brcmf_btcoex_timerfunc()
is executing, it may observe timer_on as false and skip the call to
timer_shutdown_sync().
2.The brcmf_btcoex_timerfunc() may then reschedule the brcmf_btcoex_info
worker after the cancel_work_sync() has been executed, resulting in
use-after-free bugs.
The use-after-free bugs occur in two distinct scenarios, depending on
the timing of when the brcmf_btcoex_info struct is freed relative to
the execution of its worker thread.
Scenario 1: Freed before the worker is scheduled
The brcmf_btcoex_info is deallocated before the worker is scheduled.
A race condition can occur when schedule_work(&bt_local->work) is
called after the target memory has been freed. The sequence of events
is detailed below:
CPU0 | CPU1
brcmf_btcoex_detach | brcmf_btcoex_timerfunc
| bt_local->timer_on = false;
if (cfg->btcoex->timer_on) |
... |
cancel_work_sync(); |
... |
kfree(cfg->btcoex); // FREE |
| schedule_work(&bt_local->work); // USE
Scenario 2: Freed after the worker is scheduled
The brcmf_btcoex_info is freed after the worker has been scheduled
but before or during its execution. In this case, statements within
the brcmf_btcoex_handler() — such as the container_of macro and
subsequent dereferences of the brcmf_btcoex_info object will cause
a use-after-free access. The following timeline illustrates this
scenario:
CPU0 | CPU1
brcmf_btcoex_detach | brcmf_btcoex_timerfunc
| bt_local->timer_on = false;
if (cfg->btcoex->timer_on) |
... |
cancel_work_sync(); |
... | schedule_work(); // Reschedule
|
kfree(cfg->btcoex); // FREE | brcmf_btcoex_handler() // Worker
/* | btci = container_of(....); // USE
The kfree() above could | ...
also occur at any point | btci-> // USE
during the worker's execution|
*/ |
To resolve the race conditions, drop the conditional check and call
timer_shutdown_sync() directly. It can deactivate the timer reliably,
regardless of its current state. Once stopped, the timer_on state is
then set to false. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: rose: convert 'use' field to refcount_t
The 'use' field in struct rose_neigh is used as a reference counter but
lacks atomicity. This can lead to race conditions where a rose_neigh
structure is freed while still being referenced by other code paths.
For example, when rose_neigh->use becomes zero during an ioctl operation
via rose_rt_ioctl(), the structure may be removed while its timer is
still active, potentially causing use-after-free issues.
This patch changes the type of 'use' from unsigned short to refcount_t and
updates all code paths to use rose_neigh_hold() and rose_neigh_put() which
operate reference counts atomically. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: ctnetlink: remove refcounting in expectation dumpers
Same pattern as previous patch: do not keep the expectation object
alive via refcount, only store a cookie value and then use that
as the skip hint for dump resumption.
AFAICS this has the same issue as the one resolved in the conntrack
dumper, when we do
if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&exp->use))
to increment the refcount, there is a chance that exp == last, which
causes a double-increment of the refcount and subsequent memory leak. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: qat - flush misc workqueue during device shutdown
Repeated loading and unloading of a device specific QAT driver, for
example qat_4xxx, in a tight loop can lead to a crash due to a
use-after-free scenario. This occurs when a power management (PM)
interrupt triggers just before the device-specific driver (e.g.,
qat_4xxx.ko) is unloaded, while the core driver (intel_qat.ko) remains
loaded.
Since the driver uses a shared workqueue (`qat_misc_wq`) across all
devices and owned by intel_qat.ko, a deferred routine from the
device-specific driver may still be pending in the queue. If this
routine executes after the driver is unloaded, it can dereference freed
memory, resulting in a page fault and kernel crash like the following:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffa000002e50a01c
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
RIP: 0010:pm_bh_handler+0x1d2/0x250 [intel_qat]
Call Trace:
pm_bh_handler+0x1d2/0x250 [intel_qat]
process_one_work+0x171/0x340
worker_thread+0x277/0x3a0
kthread+0xf0/0x120
ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50
To prevent this, flush the misc workqueue during device shutdown to
ensure that all pending work items are completed before the driver is
unloaded.
Note: This approach may slightly increase shutdown latency if the
workqueue contains jobs from other devices, but it ensures correctness
and stability. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vhost-scsi: Fix handling of multiple calls to vhost_scsi_set_endpoint
If vhost_scsi_set_endpoint is called multiple times without a
vhost_scsi_clear_endpoint between them, we can hit multiple bugs
found by Haoran Zhang:
1. Use-after-free when no tpgs are found:
This fixes a use after free that occurs when vhost_scsi_set_endpoint is
called more than once and calls after the first call do not find any
tpgs to add to the vs_tpg. When vhost_scsi_set_endpoint first finds
tpgs to add to the vs_tpg array match=true, so we will do:
vhost_vq_set_backend(vq, vs_tpg);
...
kfree(vs->vs_tpg);
vs->vs_tpg = vs_tpg;
If vhost_scsi_set_endpoint is called again and no tpgs are found
match=false so we skip the vhost_vq_set_backend call leaving the
pointer to the vs_tpg we then free via:
kfree(vs->vs_tpg);
vs->vs_tpg = vs_tpg;
If a scsi request is then sent we do:
vhost_scsi_handle_vq -> vhost_scsi_get_req -> vhost_vq_get_backend
which sees the vs_tpg we just did a kfree on.
2. Tpg dir removal hang:
This patch fixes an issue where we cannot remove a LIO/target layer
tpg (and structs above it like the target) dir due to the refcount
dropping to -1.
The problem is that if vhost_scsi_set_endpoint detects a tpg is already
in the vs->vs_tpg array or if the tpg has been removed so
target_depend_item fails, the undepend goto handler will do
target_undepend_item on all tpgs in the vs_tpg array dropping their
refcount to 0. At this time vs_tpg contains both the tpgs we have added
in the current vhost_scsi_set_endpoint call as well as tpgs we added in
previous calls which are also in vs->vs_tpg.
Later, when vhost_scsi_clear_endpoint runs it will do
target_undepend_item on all the tpgs in the vs->vs_tpg which will drop
their refcount to -1. Userspace will then not be able to remove the tpg
and will hang when it tries to do rmdir on the tpg dir.
3. Tpg leak:
This fixes a bug where we can leak tpgs and cause them to be
un-removable because the target name is overwritten when
vhost_scsi_set_endpoint is called multiple times but with different
target names.
The bug occurs if a user has called VHOST_SCSI_SET_ENDPOINT and setup
a vhost-scsi device to target/tpg mapping, then calls
VHOST_SCSI_SET_ENDPOINT again with a new target name that has tpgs we
haven't seen before (target1 has tpg1 but target2 has tpg2). When this
happens we don't teardown the old target tpg mapping and just overwrite
the target name and the vs->vs_tpg array. Later when we do
vhost_scsi_clear_endpoint, we are passed in either target1 or target2's
name and we will only match that target's tpgs when we loop over the
vs->vs_tpg. We will then return from the function without doing
target_undepend_item on the tpgs.
Because of all these bugs, it looks like being able to call
vhost_scsi_set_endpoint multiple times was never supported. The major
user, QEMU, already has checks to prevent this use case. So to fix the
issues, this patch prevents vhost_scsi_set_endpoint from being called
if it's already successfully added tpgs. To add, remove or change the
tpg config or target name, you must do a vhost_scsi_clear_endpoint
first. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
proc: fix UAF in proc_get_inode()
Fix race between rmmod and /proc/XXX's inode instantiation.
The bug is that pde->proc_ops don't belong to /proc, it belongs to a
module, therefore dereferencing it after /proc entry has been registered
is a bug unless use_pde/unuse_pde() pair has been used.
use_pde/unuse_pde can be avoided (2 atomic ops!) because pde->proc_ops
never changes so information necessary for inode instantiation can be
saved _before_ proc_register() in PDE itself and used later, avoiding
pde->proc_ops->... dereference.
rmmod lookup
sys_delete_module
proc_lookup_de
pde_get(de);
proc_get_inode(dir->i_sb, de);
mod->exit()
proc_remove
remove_proc_subtree
proc_entry_rundown(de);
free_module(mod);
if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
if (de->proc_ops->proc_read_iter)
--> As module is already freed, will trigger UAF
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff80a702b
PGD 817fc4067 P4D 817fc4067 PUD 817fc0067 PMD 102ef4067 PTE 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 26 UID: 0 PID: 2667 Comm: ls Tainted: G
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
RIP: 0010:proc_get_inode+0x302/0x6e0
RSP: 0018:ffff88811c837998 EFLAGS: 00010a06
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffffffffc0538140 RCX: 0000000000000007
RDX: 1ffffffff80a702b RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffffc0538158
RBP: ffff8881299a6000 R08: 0000000067bbe1e5 R09: 1ffff11023906f20
R10: ffffffffb560ca07 R11: ffffffffb2b43a58 R12: ffff888105bb78f0
R13: ffff888100518048 R14: ffff8881299a6004 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007f95b9686840(0000) GS:ffff8883af100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: fffffbfff80a702b CR3: 0000000117dd2000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
proc_lookup_de+0x11f/0x2e0
__lookup_slow+0x188/0x350
walk_component+0x2ab/0x4f0
path_lookupat+0x120/0x660
filename_lookup+0x1ce/0x560
vfs_statx+0xac/0x150
__do_sys_newstat+0x96/0x110
do_syscall_64+0x5f/0x170
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[adobriyan@gmail.com: don't do 2 atomic ops on the common path] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: gso: fix ownership in __udp_gso_segment
In __udp_gso_segment the skb destructor is removed before segmenting the
skb but the socket reference is kept as-is. This is an issue if the
original skb is later orphaned as we can hit the following bug:
kernel BUG at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:3312! (skb_orphan)
RIP: 0010:ip_rcv_core+0x8b2/0xca0
Call Trace:
ip_rcv+0xab/0x6e0
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x168/0x1b0
process_backlog+0x384/0x1100
__napi_poll.constprop.0+0xa1/0x370
net_rx_action+0x925/0xe50
The above can happen following a sequence of events when using
OpenVSwitch, when an OVS_ACTION_ATTR_USERSPACE action precedes an
OVS_ACTION_ATTR_OUTPUT action:
1. OVS_ACTION_ATTR_USERSPACE is handled (in do_execute_actions): the skb
goes through queue_gso_packets and then __udp_gso_segment, where its
destructor is removed.
2. The segments' data are copied and sent to userspace.
3. OVS_ACTION_ATTR_OUTPUT is handled (in do_execute_actions) and the
same original skb is sent to its path.
4. If it later hits skb_orphan, we hit the bug.
Fix this by also removing the reference to the socket in
__udp_gso_segment. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovl: fix UAF in ovl_dentry_update_reval by moving dput() in ovl_link_up
The issue was caused by dput(upper) being called before
ovl_dentry_update_reval(), while upper->d_flags was still
accessed in ovl_dentry_remote().
Move dput(upper) after its last use to prevent use-after-free.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ovl_dentry_remote fs/overlayfs/util.c:162 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ovl_dentry_update_reval+0xd2/0xf0 fs/overlayfs/util.c:167
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:114
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0xc3/0x620 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0xd9/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:601
ovl_dentry_remote fs/overlayfs/util.c:162 [inline]
ovl_dentry_update_reval+0xd2/0xf0 fs/overlayfs/util.c:167
ovl_link_up fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c:610 [inline]
ovl_copy_up_one+0x2105/0x3490 fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c:1170
ovl_copy_up_flags+0x18d/0x200 fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c:1223
ovl_rename+0x39e/0x18c0 fs/overlayfs/dir.c:1136
vfs_rename+0xf84/0x20a0 fs/namei.c:4893
...
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, test_run: Fix use-after-free issue in eth_skb_pkt_type()
KMSAN reported a use-after-free issue in eth_skb_pkt_type()[1]. The
cause of the issue was that eth_skb_pkt_type() accessed skb's data
that didn't contain an Ethernet header. This occurs when
bpf_prog_test_run_xdp() passes an invalid value as the user_data
argument to bpf_test_init().
Fix this by returning an error when user_data is less than ETH_HLEN in
bpf_test_init(). Additionally, remove the check for "if (user_size >
size)" as it is unnecessary.
[1]
BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in eth_skb_pkt_type include/linux/etherdevice.h:627 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: use-after-free in eth_type_trans+0x4ee/0x980 net/ethernet/eth.c:165
eth_skb_pkt_type include/linux/etherdevice.h:627 [inline]
eth_type_trans+0x4ee/0x980 net/ethernet/eth.c:165
__xdp_build_skb_from_frame+0x5a8/0xa50 net/core/xdp.c:635
xdp_recv_frames net/bpf/test_run.c:272 [inline]
xdp_test_run_batch net/bpf/test_run.c:361 [inline]
bpf_test_run_xdp_live+0x2954/0x3330 net/bpf/test_run.c:390
bpf_prog_test_run_xdp+0x148e/0x1b10 net/bpf/test_run.c:1318
bpf_prog_test_run+0x5b7/0xa30 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4371
__sys_bpf+0x6a6/0xe20 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5777
__do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5866 [inline]
__se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5864 [inline]
__x64_sys_bpf+0xa4/0xf0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5864
x64_sys_call+0x2ea0/0x3d90 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:322
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Uninit was created at:
free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1056 [inline]
free_unref_page+0x156/0x1320 mm/page_alloc.c:2657
__free_pages+0xa3/0x1b0 mm/page_alloc.c:4838
bpf_ringbuf_free kernel/bpf/ringbuf.c:226 [inline]
ringbuf_map_free+0xff/0x1e0 kernel/bpf/ringbuf.c:235
bpf_map_free kernel/bpf/syscall.c:838 [inline]
bpf_map_free_deferred+0x17c/0x310 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:862
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa2b/0x1b60 kernel/workqueue.c:3310
worker_thread+0xedf/0x1550 kernel/workqueue.c:3391
kthread+0x535/0x6b0 kernel/kthread.c:389
ret_from_fork+0x6e/0x90 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 17276 Comm: syz.1.16450 Not tainted 6.12.0-05490-g9bb88c659673 #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/migrate_device: don't add folio to be freed to LRU in migrate_device_finalize()
If migration succeeded, we called
folio_migrate_flags()->mem_cgroup_migrate() to migrate the memcg from the
old to the new folio. This will set memcg_data of the old folio to 0.
Similarly, if migration failed, memcg_data of the dst folio is left unset.
If we call folio_putback_lru() on such folios (memcg_data == 0), we will
add the folio to be freed to the LRU, making memcg code unhappy. Running
the hmm selftests:
# ./hmm-tests
...
# RUN hmm.hmm_device_private.migrate ...
[ 102.078007][T14893] page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x7ff27d200 pfn:0x13cc00
[ 102.079974][T14893] anon flags: 0x17ff00000020018(uptodate|dirty|swapbacked|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
[ 102.082037][T14893] raw: 017ff00000020018 dead000000000100 dead000000000122 ffff8881353896c9
[ 102.083687][T14893] raw: 00000007ff27d200 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 102.085331][T14893] page dumped because: VM_WARN_ON_ONCE_FOLIO(!memcg && !mem_cgroup_disabled())
[ 102.087230][T14893] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 102.088279][T14893] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 14893 at ./include/linux/memcontrol.h:726 folio_lruvec_lock_irqsave+0x10e/0x170
[ 102.090478][T14893] Modules linked in:
[ 102.091244][T14893] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 14893 Comm: hmm-tests Not tainted 6.13.0-09623-g6c216bc522fd #151
[ 102.093089][T14893] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
[ 102.094848][T14893] RIP: 0010:folio_lruvec_lock_irqsave+0x10e/0x170
[ 102.096104][T14893] Code: ...
[ 102.099908][T14893] RSP: 0018:ffffc900236c37b0 EFLAGS: 00010293
[ 102.101152][T14893] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffea0004f30000 RCX: ffffffff8183f426
[ 102.102684][T14893] RDX: ffff8881063cb880 RSI: ffffffff81b8117f RDI: ffff8881063cb880
[ 102.104227][T14893] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 102.105757][T14893] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffffc900236c37d8
[ 102.107296][T14893] R13: ffff888277a2bcb0 R14: 000000000000001f R15: 0000000000000000
[ 102.108830][T14893] FS: 00007ff27dbdd740(0000) GS:ffff888277a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 102.110643][T14893] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 102.111924][T14893] CR2: 00007ff27d400000 CR3: 000000010866e000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
[ 102.113478][T14893] PKRU: 55555554
[ 102.114172][T14893] Call Trace:
[ 102.114805][T14893] <TASK>
[ 102.115397][T14893] ? folio_lruvec_lock_irqsave+0x10e/0x170
[ 102.116547][T14893] ? __warn.cold+0x110/0x210
[ 102.117461][T14893] ? folio_lruvec_lock_irqsave+0x10e/0x170
[ 102.118667][T14893] ? report_bug+0x1b9/0x320
[ 102.119571][T14893] ? handle_bug+0x54/0x90
[ 102.120494][T14893] ? exc_invalid_op+0x17/0x50
[ 102.121433][T14893] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[ 102.122435][T14893] ? __wake_up_klogd.part.0+0x76/0xd0
[ 102.123506][T14893] ? dump_page+0x4f/0x60
[ 102.124352][T14893] ? folio_lruvec_lock_irqsave+0x10e/0x170
[ 102.125500][T14893] folio_batch_move_lru+0xd4/0x200
[ 102.126577][T14893] ? __pfx_lru_add+0x10/0x10
[ 102.127505][T14893] __folio_batch_add_and_move+0x391/0x720
[ 102.128633][T14893] ? __pfx_lru_add+0x10/0x10
[ 102.129550][T14893] folio_putback_lru+0x16/0x80
[ 102.130564][T14893] migrate_device_finalize+0x9b/0x530
[ 102.131640][T14893] dmirror_migrate_to_device.constprop.0+0x7c5/0xad0
[ 102.133047][T14893] dmirror_fops_unlocked_ioctl+0x89b/0xc80
Likely, nothing else goes wrong: putting the last folio reference will
remove the folio from the LRU again. So besides memcg complaining, adding
the folio to be freed to the LRU is just an unnecessary step.
The new flow resembles what we have in migrate_folio_move(): add the dst
to the lru, rem
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
geneve: Fix use-after-free in geneve_find_dev().
syzkaller reported a use-after-free in geneve_find_dev() [0]
without repro.
geneve_configure() links struct geneve_dev.next to
net_generic(net, geneve_net_id)->geneve_list.
The net here could differ from dev_net(dev) if IFLA_NET_NS_PID,
IFLA_NET_NS_FD, or IFLA_TARGET_NETNSID is set.
When dev_net(dev) is dismantled, geneve_exit_batch_rtnl() finally
calls unregister_netdevice_queue() for each dev in the netns,
and later the dev is freed.
However, its geneve_dev.next is still linked to the backend UDP
socket netns.
Then, use-after-free will occur when another geneve dev is created
in the netns.
Let's call geneve_dellink() instead in geneve_destroy_tunnels().
[0]:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in geneve_find_dev drivers/net/geneve.c:1295 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in geneve_configure+0x234/0x858 drivers/net/geneve.c:1343
Read of size 2 at addr ffff000054d6ee24 by task syz.1.4029/13441
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 13441 Comm: syz.1.4029 Not tainted 6.13.0-g0ad9617c78ac #24 dc35ca22c79fb82e8e7bc5c9c9adafea898b1e3d
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
show_stack+0x38/0x50 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:466 (C)
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0xbc/0x108 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0x16c/0x6f0 mm/kasan/report.c:489
kasan_report+0xc0/0x120 mm/kasan/report.c:602
__asan_report_load2_noabort+0x20/0x30 mm/kasan/report_generic.c:379
geneve_find_dev drivers/net/geneve.c:1295 [inline]
geneve_configure+0x234/0x858 drivers/net/geneve.c:1343
geneve_newlink+0xb8/0x128 drivers/net/geneve.c:1634
rtnl_newlink_create+0x23c/0x868 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3795
__rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3906 [inline]
rtnl_newlink+0x1054/0x1630 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4021
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x61c/0x918 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6911
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1dc/0x398 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543
rtnetlink_rcv+0x34/0x50 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6938
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1322 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x618/0x838 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1348
netlink_sendmsg+0x5fc/0x8b0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1892
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:713 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:728 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x410/0x6f8 net/socket.c:2568
___sys_sendmsg+0x178/0x1d8 net/socket.c:2622
__sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2654 [inline]
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2659 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2657 [inline]
__arm64_sys_sendmsg+0x12c/0x1c8 net/socket.c:2657
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x90/0x278 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49
el0_svc_common+0x13c/0x250 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132
do_el0_svc+0x54/0x70 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151
el0_svc+0x4c/0xa8 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:744
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:762
el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x1a0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:600
Allocated by task 13247:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x30/0x68 mm/kasan/common.c:68
kasan_save_alloc_info+0x44/0x58 mm/kasan/generic.c:568
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x84/0xa0 mm/kasan/common.c:394
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4298 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_noprof+0x2a0/0x560 mm/slub.c:4304
__kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x9c/0x230 mm/util.c:645
alloc_netdev_mqs+0xb8/0x11a0 net/core/dev.c:11470
rtnl_create_link+0x2b8/0xb50 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3604
rtnl_newlink_create+0x19c/0x868 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3780
__rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3906 [inline]
rtnl_newlink+0x1054/0x1630 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4021
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x61c/0x918 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6911
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1dc/0x398 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2543
rtnetlink_rcv+0x34/0x50 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6938
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_n
---truncated--- |
