| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sch_hfsc: make hfsc_qlen_notify() idempotent
hfsc_qlen_notify() is not idempotent either and not friendly
to its callers, like fq_codel_dequeue(). Let's make it idempotent
to ease qdisc_tree_reduce_backlog() callers' life:
1. update_vf() decreases cl->cl_nactive, so we can check whether it is
non-zero before calling it.
2. eltree_remove() always removes RB node cl->el_node, but we can use
RB_EMPTY_NODE() + RB_CLEAR_NODE() to make it safe. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
thunderbolt: Do not double dequeue a configuration request
Some of our devices crash in tb_cfg_request_dequeue():
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead000000000122
CPU: 6 PID: 91007 Comm: kworker/6:2 Tainted: G U W 6.6.65
RIP: 0010:tb_cfg_request_dequeue+0x2d/0xa0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? tb_cfg_request_dequeue+0x2d/0xa0
tb_cfg_request_work+0x33/0x80
worker_thread+0x386/0x8f0
kthread+0xed/0x110
ret_from_fork+0x38/0x50
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
The circumstances are unclear, however, the theory is that
tb_cfg_request_work() can be scheduled twice for a request:
first time via frame.callback from ring_work() and second
time from tb_cfg_request(). Both times kworkers will execute
tb_cfg_request_dequeue(), which results in double list_del()
from the ctl->request_queue (the list poison deference hints
at it: 0xdead000000000122).
Do not dequeue requests that don't have TB_CFG_REQUEST_ACTIVE
bit set. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: marvell/cesa - Handle zero-length skcipher requests
Do not access random memory for zero-length skcipher requests.
Just return 0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
erofs: avoid using multiple devices with different type
For multiple devices, both primary and extra devices should be the
same type. `erofs_init_device` has already guaranteed that if the
primary is a file-backed device, extra devices should also be
regular files.
However, if the primary is a block device while the extra device
is a file-backed device, `erofs_init_device` will get an ENOTBLK,
which is not treated as an error in `erofs_fc_get_tree`, and that
leads to an UAF:
erofs_fc_get_tree
get_tree_bdev_flags(erofs_fc_fill_super)
erofs_read_superblock
erofs_init_device // sbi->dif0 is not inited yet,
// return -ENOTBLK
deactivate_locked_super
free(sbi)
if (err is -ENOTBLK)
sbi->dif0.file = filp_open() // sbi UAF
So if -ENOTBLK is hitted in `erofs_init_device`, it means the
primary device must be a block device, and the extra device
is not a block device. The error can be converted to -EINVAL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, sockmap: Fix panic when calling skb_linearize
The panic can be reproduced by executing the command:
./bench sockmap -c 2 -p 1 -a --rx-verdict-ingress --rx-strp 100000
Then a kernel panic was captured:
'''
[ 657.460555] kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:2178!
[ 657.462680] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[ 657.463287] Workqueue: events sk_psock_backlog
...
[ 657.469610] <TASK>
[ 657.469738] ? die+0x36/0x90
[ 657.469916] ? do_trap+0x1d0/0x270
[ 657.470118] ? pskb_expand_head+0x612/0xf40
[ 657.470376] ? pskb_expand_head+0x612/0xf40
[ 657.470620] ? do_error_trap+0xa3/0x170
[ 657.470846] ? pskb_expand_head+0x612/0xf40
[ 657.471092] ? handle_invalid_op+0x2c/0x40
[ 657.471335] ? pskb_expand_head+0x612/0xf40
[ 657.471579] ? exc_invalid_op+0x2d/0x40
[ 657.471805] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
[ 657.472052] ? pskb_expand_head+0xd1/0xf40
[ 657.472292] ? pskb_expand_head+0x612/0xf40
[ 657.472540] ? lock_acquire+0x18f/0x4e0
[ 657.472766] ? find_held_lock+0x2d/0x110
[ 657.472999] ? __pfx_pskb_expand_head+0x10/0x10
[ 657.473263] ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x5b/0x470
[ 657.473537] ? __pfx___lock_release.isra.0+0x10/0x10
[ 657.473826] __pskb_pull_tail+0xfd/0x1d20
[ 657.474062] ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x4e/0x90
[ 657.474707] sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue+0x3bf/0x510
[ 657.475392] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
[ 657.476010] sk_psock_backlog+0x5cf/0xd70
[ 657.476637] process_one_work+0x858/0x1a20
'''
The panic originates from the assertion BUG_ON(skb_shared(skb)) in
skb_linearize(). A previous commit(see Fixes tag) introduced skb_get()
to avoid race conditions between skb operations in the backlog and skb
release in the recvmsg path. However, this caused the panic to always
occur when skb_linearize is executed.
The "--rx-strp 100000" parameter forces the RX path to use the strparser
module which aggregates data until it reaches 100KB before calling sockmap
logic. The 100KB payload exceeds MAX_MSG_FRAGS, triggering skb_linearize.
To fix this issue, just move skb_get into sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue.
'''
sk_psock_backlog:
sk_psock_handle_skb
skb_get(skb) <== we move it into 'sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue'
sk_psock_skb_ingress____________
↓
|
| → sk_psock_skb_ingress_self
| sk_psock_skb_ingress_enqueue
sk_psock_verdict_apply_________________↑ skb_linearize
'''
Note that for verdict_apply path, the skb_get operation is unnecessary so
we add 'take_ref' param to control it's behavior. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: zone: fix to avoid inconsistence in between SIT and SSA
w/ below testcase, it will cause inconsistence in between SIT and SSA.
create_null_blk 512 2 1024 1024
mkfs.f2fs -m /dev/nullb0
mount /dev/nullb0 /mnt/f2fs/
touch /mnt/f2fs/file
f2fs_io pinfile set /mnt/f2fs/file
fallocate -l 4GiB /mnt/f2fs/file
F2FS-fs (nullb0): Inconsistent segment (0) type [1, 0] in SSA and SIT
CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 2398 Comm: fallocate Tainted: G O 6.13.0-rc1 #84
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS VirtualBox 12/01/2006
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xb3/0xd0
dump_stack+0x14/0x20
f2fs_handle_critical_error+0x18c/0x220 [f2fs]
f2fs_stop_checkpoint+0x38/0x50 [f2fs]
do_garbage_collect+0x674/0x6e0 [f2fs]
f2fs_gc_range+0x12b/0x230 [f2fs]
f2fs_allocate_pinning_section+0x5c/0x150 [f2fs]
f2fs_expand_inode_data+0x1cc/0x3c0 [f2fs]
f2fs_fallocate+0x3c3/0x410 [f2fs]
vfs_fallocate+0x15f/0x4b0
__x64_sys_fallocate+0x4a/0x80
x64_sys_call+0x15e8/0x1b80
do_syscall_64+0x68/0x130
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0x6f
RIP: 0033:0x7f9dba5197ca
F2FS-fs (nullb0): Stopped filesystem due to reason: 4
The reason is f2fs_gc_range() may try to migrate block in curseg, however,
its SSA block is not uptodate due to the last summary block data is still
in cache of curseg.
In this patch, we add a condition in f2fs_gc_range() to check whether
section is opened or not, and skip block migration for opened section. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_packet: move notifier's packet_dev_mc out of rcu critical section
Syzkaller reports the following issue:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:578
__mutex_lock+0x106/0xe80 kernel/locking/mutex.c:746
team_change_rx_flags+0x38/0x220 drivers/net/team/team_core.c:1781
dev_change_rx_flags net/core/dev.c:9145 [inline]
__dev_set_promiscuity+0x3f8/0x590 net/core/dev.c:9189
netif_set_promiscuity+0x50/0xe0 net/core/dev.c:9201
dev_set_promiscuity+0x126/0x260 net/core/dev_api.c:286 packet_dev_mc net/packet/af_packet.c:3698 [inline]
packet_dev_mclist_delete net/packet/af_packet.c:3722 [inline]
packet_notifier+0x292/0xa60 net/packet/af_packet.c:4247
notifier_call_chain+0x1b3/0x3e0 kernel/notifier.c:85
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2214 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2228 [inline]
unregister_netdevice_many_notify+0x15d8/0x2330 net/core/dev.c:11972
rtnl_delete_link net/core/rtnetlink.c:3522 [inline]
rtnl_dellink+0x488/0x710 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3564
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x7cf/0xb70 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6955
netlink_rcv_skb+0x219/0x490 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2534
Calling `PACKET_ADD_MEMBERSHIP` on an ops-locked device can trigger
the `NETDEV_UNREGISTER` notifier, which may require disabling promiscuous
and/or allmulti mode. Both of these operations require acquiring
the netdev instance lock.
Move the call to `packet_dev_mc` outside of the RCU critical section.
The `mclist` modifications (add, del, flush, unregister) are protected by
the RTNL, not the RCU. The RCU only protects the `sklist` and its
associated `sks`. The delayed operation on the `mclist` entry remains
within the RTNL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfs: Fix oops in write-retry from mis-resetting the subreq iterator
Fix the resetting of the subrequest iterator in netfs_retry_write_stream()
to use the iterator-reset function as the iterator may have been shortened
by a previous retry. In such a case, the amount of data to be written by
the subrequest is not "subreq->len" but "subreq->len -
subreq->transferred".
Without this, KASAN may see an error in iov_iter_revert():
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in iov_iter_revert lib/iov_iter.c:633 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in iov_iter_revert+0x443/0x5a0 lib/iov_iter.c:611
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88802912a0b8 by task kworker/u32:7/1147
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1147 Comm: kworker/u32:7 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc6-syzkaller-00052-g9f35e33144ae #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: events_unbound netfs_write_collection_worker
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:408 [inline]
print_report+0xc3/0x670 mm/kasan/report.c:521
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:634
iov_iter_revert lib/iov_iter.c:633 [inline]
iov_iter_revert+0x443/0x5a0 lib/iov_iter.c:611
netfs_retry_write_stream fs/netfs/write_retry.c:44 [inline]
netfs_retry_writes+0x166d/0x1a50 fs/netfs/write_retry.c:231
netfs_collect_write_results fs/netfs/write_collect.c:352 [inline]
netfs_write_collection_worker+0x23fd/0x3830 fs/netfs/write_collect.c:374
process_one_work+0x9cf/0x1b70 kernel/workqueue.c:3238
process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3319 [inline]
worker_thread+0x6c8/0xf10 kernel/workqueue.c:3400
kthread+0x3c2/0x780 kernel/kthread.c:464
ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:153
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: fix udp gso skb_segment after pull from frag_list
Commit a1e40ac5b5e9 ("net: gso: fix udp gso fraglist segmentation after
pull from frag_list") detected invalid geometry in frag_list skbs and
redirects them from skb_segment_list to more robust skb_segment. But some
packets with modified geometry can also hit bugs in that code. We don't
know how many such cases exist. Addressing each one by one also requires
touching the complex skb_segment code, which risks introducing bugs for
other types of skbs. Instead, linearize all these packets that fail the
basic invariants on gso fraglist skbs. That is more robust.
If only part of the fraglist payload is pulled into head_skb, it will
always cause exception when splitting skbs by skb_segment. For detailed
call stack information, see below.
Valid SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST skbs
- consist of two or more segments
- the head_skb holds the protocol headers plus first gso_size
- one or more frag_list skbs hold exactly one segment
- all but the last must be gso_size
Optional datapath hooks such as NAT and BPF (bpf_skb_pull_data) can
modify fraglist skbs, breaking these invariants.
In extreme cases they pull one part of data into skb linear. For UDP,
this causes three payloads with lengths of (11,11,10) bytes were
pulled tail to become (12,10,10) bytes.
The skbs no longer meets the above SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST conditions because
payload was pulled into head_skb, it needs to be linearized before pass
to regular skb_segment.
skb_segment+0xcd0/0xd14
__udp_gso_segment+0x334/0x5f4
udp4_ufo_fragment+0x118/0x15c
inet_gso_segment+0x164/0x338
skb_mac_gso_segment+0xc4/0x13c
__skb_gso_segment+0xc4/0x124
validate_xmit_skb+0x9c/0x2c0
validate_xmit_skb_list+0x4c/0x80
sch_direct_xmit+0x70/0x404
__dev_queue_xmit+0x64c/0xe5c
neigh_resolve_output+0x178/0x1c4
ip_finish_output2+0x37c/0x47c
__ip_finish_output+0x194/0x240
ip_finish_output+0x20/0xf4
ip_output+0x100/0x1a0
NF_HOOK+0xc4/0x16c
ip_forward+0x314/0x32c
ip_rcv+0x90/0x118
__netif_receive_skb+0x74/0x124
process_backlog+0xe8/0x1a4
__napi_poll+0x5c/0x1f8
net_rx_action+0x154/0x314
handle_softirqs+0x154/0x4b8
[118.376811] [C201134] rxq0_pus: [name:bug&]kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:4278!
[118.376829] [C201134] rxq0_pus: [name:traps&]Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[118.470774] [C201134] rxq0_pus: [name:mrdump&]Kernel Offset: 0x178cc00000 from 0xffffffc008000000
[118.470810] [C201134] rxq0_pus: [name:mrdump&]PHYS_OFFSET: 0x40000000
[118.470827] [C201134] rxq0_pus: [name:mrdump&]pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO)
[118.470848] [C201134] rxq0_pus: [name:mrdump&]pc : [0xffffffd79598aefc] skb_segment+0xcd0/0xd14
[118.470900] [C201134] rxq0_pus: [name:mrdump&]lr : [0xffffffd79598a5e8] skb_segment+0x3bc/0xd14
[118.470928] [C201134] rxq0_pus: [name:mrdump&]sp : ffffffc008013770 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: wwan: t7xx: Fix napi rx poll issue
When driver handles the napi rx polling requests, the netdev might
have been released by the dellink logic triggered by the disconnect
operation on user plane. However, in the logic of processing skb in
polling, an invalid netdev is still being used, which causes a panic.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000f1
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
RIP: 0010:dev_gro_receive+0x3a/0x620
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
? __die_body+0x68/0xb0
? page_fault_oops+0x379/0x3e0
? exc_page_fault+0x4f/0xa0
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
? __pfx_t7xx_ccmni_recv_skb+0x10/0x10 [mtk_t7xx (HASH:1400 7)]
? dev_gro_receive+0x3a/0x620
napi_gro_receive+0xad/0x170
t7xx_ccmni_recv_skb+0x48/0x70 [mtk_t7xx (HASH:1400 7)]
t7xx_dpmaif_napi_rx_poll+0x590/0x800 [mtk_t7xx (HASH:1400 7)]
net_rx_action+0x103/0x470
irq_exit_rcu+0x13a/0x310
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x56/0x90
</IRQ> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Don't treat wb connector as physical in create_validate_stream_for_sink
Don't try to operate on a drm_wb_connector as an amdgpu_dm_connector.
While dereferencing aconnector->base will "work" it's wrong and
might lead to unknown bad things. Just... don't. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: use list_first_entry_or_null for opinfo_get_list()
The list_first_entry() macro never returns NULL. If the list is
empty then it returns an invalid pointer. Use list_first_entry_or_null()
to check if the list is empty. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drivers/rapidio/rio_cm.c: prevent possible heap overwrite
In
riocm_cdev_ioctl(RIO_CM_CHAN_SEND)
-> cm_chan_msg_send()
-> riocm_ch_send()
cm_chan_msg_send() checks that userspace didn't send too much data but
riocm_ch_send() failed to check that userspace sent sufficient data. The
result is that riocm_ch_send() can write to fields in the rio_ch_chan_hdr
which were outside the bounds of the space which cm_chan_msg_send()
allocated.
Address this by teaching riocm_ch_send() to check that the entire
rio_ch_chan_hdr was copied in from userspace. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/hugetlb: fix huge_pmd_unshare() vs GUP-fast race
huge_pmd_unshare() drops a reference on a page table that may have
previously been shared across processes, potentially turning it into a
normal page table used in another process in which unrelated VMAs can
afterwards be installed.
If this happens in the middle of a concurrent gup_fast(), gup_fast() could
end up walking the page tables of another process. While I don't see any
way in which that immediately leads to kernel memory corruption, it is
really weird and unexpected.
Fix it with an explicit broadcast IPI through tlb_remove_table_sync_one(),
just like we do in khugepaged when removing page tables for a THP
collapse. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Increase block_sequence array size
[Why]
It's possible to generate more than 50 steps in hwss_build_fast_sequence,
for example with a 6-pipe asic where all pipes are in one MPC chain. This
overflows the block_sequence buffer and corrupts block_sequence_steps,
causing a crash.
[How]
Expand block_sequence to 100 items. A naive upper bound on the possible
number of steps for a 6-pipe asic, ignoring the potential for steps to be
mutually exclusive, is 91 with current code, therefore 100 is sufficient. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vhost-scsi: protect vq->log_used with vq->mutex
The vhost-scsi completion path may access vq->log_base when vq->log_used is
already set to false.
vhost-thread QEMU-thread
vhost_scsi_complete_cmd_work()
-> vhost_add_used()
-> vhost_add_used_n()
if (unlikely(vq->log_used))
QEMU disables vq->log_used
via VHOST_SET_VRING_ADDR.
mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
vq->log_used = false now!
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
QEMU gfree(vq->log_base)
log_used()
-> log_write(vq->log_base)
Assuming the VMM is QEMU. The vq->log_base is from QEMU userpace and can be
reclaimed via gfree(). As a result, this causes invalid memory writes to
QEMU userspace.
The control queue path has the same issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
orangefs: Do not truncate file size
'len' is used to store the result of i_size_read(), so making 'len'
a size_t results in truncation to 4GiB on 32-bit systems. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
genirq/msi: Store the IOMMU IOVA directly in msi_desc instead of iommu_cookie
The IOMMU translation for MSI message addresses has been a 2-step process,
separated in time:
1) iommu_dma_prepare_msi(): A cookie pointer containing the IOVA address
is stored in the MSI descriptor when an MSI interrupt is allocated.
2) iommu_dma_compose_msi_msg(): this cookie pointer is used to compute a
translated message address.
This has an inherent lifetime problem for the pointer stored in the cookie
that must remain valid between the two steps. However, there is no locking
at the irq layer that helps protect the lifetime. Today, this works under
the assumption that the iommu domain is not changed while MSI interrupts
being programmed. This is true for normal DMA API users within the kernel,
as the iommu domain is attached before the driver is probed and cannot be
changed while a driver is attached.
Classic VFIO type1 also prevented changing the iommu domain while VFIO was
running as it does not support changing the "container" after starting up.
However, iommufd has improved this so that the iommu domain can be changed
during VFIO operation. This potentially allows userspace to directly race
VFIO_DEVICE_ATTACH_IOMMUFD_PT (which calls iommu_attach_group()) and
VFIO_DEVICE_SET_IRQS (which calls into iommu_dma_compose_msi_msg()).
This potentially causes both the cookie pointer and the unlocked call to
iommu_get_domain_for_dev() on the MSI translation path to become UAFs.
Fix the MSI cookie UAF by removing the cookie pointer. The translated IOVA
address is already known during iommu_dma_prepare_msi() and cannot change.
Thus, it can simply be stored as an integer in the MSI descriptor.
The other UAF related to iommu_get_domain_for_dev() will be addressed in
patch "iommu: Make iommu_dma_prepare_msi() into a generic operation" by
using the IOMMU group mutex. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
espintcp: fix skb leaks
A few error paths are missing a kfree_skb. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: Fix use-after-free in cifs_fill_dirent
There is a race condition in the readdir concurrency process, which may
access the rsp buffer after it has been released, triggering the
following KASAN warning.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in cifs_fill_dirent+0xb03/0xb60 [cifs]
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880099b819c by task a.out/342975
CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 342975 Comm: a.out Not tainted 6.15.0-rc6+ #240 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.1-2.fc37 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70
print_report+0xce/0x640
kasan_report+0xb8/0xf0
cifs_fill_dirent+0xb03/0xb60 [cifs]
cifs_readdir+0x12cb/0x3190 [cifs]
iterate_dir+0x1a1/0x520
__x64_sys_getdents+0x134/0x220
do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x110
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7f996f64b9f9
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89
f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01
f0 ff ff 0d f7 c3 0c 00 f7 d8 64 89 8
RSP: 002b:00007f996f53de78 EFLAGS: 00000207 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f996f53ecdc RCX: 00007f996f64b9f9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f996f53dea0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000207 R12: ffffffffffffff88
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffc8cd9a500 R15: 00007f996f51e000
</TASK>
Allocated by task 408:
kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x6e/0x70
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x117/0x3d0
mempool_alloc_noprof+0xf2/0x2c0
cifs_buf_get+0x36/0x80 [cifs]
allocate_buffers+0x1d2/0x330 [cifs]
cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x22b/0x2690 [cifs]
kthread+0x394/0x720
ret_from_fork+0x34/0x70
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Freed by task 342979:
kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x37/0x50
kmem_cache_free+0x2b8/0x500
cifs_buf_release+0x3c/0x70 [cifs]
cifs_readdir+0x1c97/0x3190 [cifs]
iterate_dir+0x1a1/0x520
__x64_sys_getdents64+0x134/0x220
do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x110
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880099b8000
which belongs to the cache cifs_request of size 16588
The buggy address is located 412 bytes inside of
freed 16588-byte region [ffff8880099b8000, ffff8880099bc0cc)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x99b8
head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
anon flags: 0x80000000000040(head|node=0|zone=1)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 0080000000000040 ffff888001e03400 0000000000000000 dead000000000001
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000010001 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 0080000000000040 ffff888001e03400 0000000000000000 dead000000000001
head: 0000000000000000 0000000000010001 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000
head: 0080000000000003 ffffea0000266e01 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff
head: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000008
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8880099b8080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8880099b8100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
>ffff8880099b8180: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8880099b8200: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8880099b8280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
POC is available in the link [1].
The problem triggering process is as follows:
Process 1 Process 2
-----------------------------------
---truncated--- |
