| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: validate TX_CMD response layout
TX_CMD parsing uses frame_count to walk status entries and then
read the trailing SCD SSN. Make the minimum-length check follow
that exact runtime layout calculation before parsing the payload.
For new TX API, reject TX_CMD responses with frame_count != 1 and
warn/return in the aggregation handler to document that aggregated
accounting is expected via BA notifications. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
remoteproc: qcom_wcnss: Fix handling the lack of PD regulators in v3
The changes introduced to handle single power domain platforms have
swapped the info pointer increment from num_pd_vregs to num_pds, which
would shift the info pointer past the end of the array for pronto-v3,
which does not list power domain regulators in vregs.
This showed up as a difference between GCC- and LLVM-compiled kernels
on SDM632 devices, where only with LLVM one would get the
"regulator request with no identifier" error, because the out-of-bounds
memory ended up being zeroed. Fix by skipping the increment when there
are more power domains than regulators. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/sysfb: simpledrm: Improve stride validation
Validate the computed stride against the maximum value INT_MAX. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: convert nfsd_net boolean flags to unsigned long flags word
nfsd_net contains several boolean fields that are accessed from
concurrent contexts without serialization. In particular,
nfsd4_end_grace() guards its drain path with a plain bool:
if (nn->grace_ended)
return;
nn->grace_ended = true;
The read and the write are independent, and nothing in struct
nfsd_net serializes them. At least two contexts can reach this
code with no lock held:
laundromat path
laundry_wq kworker
nfs4_laundromat()
nfsd4_end_grace()
RECLAIM_COMPLETE path
nfsd compound kthread
nfsd4_reclaim_complete()
inc_reclaim_complete()
nfsd4_end_grace()
Both callers can observe grace_ended == false on different CPUs,
both store true, and both proceed into nfsd4_record_grace_done(),
which invokes the active client_tracking_ops->grace_done callback.
For tracking ops that drain reclaim_str_hashtbl (legacy_tracking_ops
via nfsd4_recdir_purge_old, and the cld v1+ ops via
nfsd4_cld_grace_done), grace_done calls nfs4_release_reclaim(),
which walks every bucket of reclaim_str_hashtbl with no lock and
calls nfs4_remove_reclaim_record() (list_del + kfree) on each
entry. Two concurrent walkers corrupt the list and double-free
every nfs4_client_reclaim. A concurrent nfsd4_find_reclaim_client()
iterating the same bucket reads through freed memory.
A third call site exists in nfs4_state_start_net() on the
skip_grace startup path, but it runs under nfsd_mutex before any
client has connected and before the laundromat's first delayed
work fires, so it cannot race with the two callers above.
Replace the scattered boolean fields in nfsd_net with a single
unsigned long flags word and an enum nfsd_net_flag for the bit
positions. The grace_ended race is fixed by using
test_and_set_bit(), which is atomic on all architectures. The
remaining flags (grace_end_forced, in_grace, somebody_reclaimed,
track_reclaim_completes, nfsd_net_up, lockd_up) are converted to
use test_bit/set_bit/clear_bit for consistency. This avoids
sub-word cmpxchg issues on architectures like Hexagon that only
support word-sized atomic operations. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i3c: master: Fix recursive locking during device registration
i3c_master_register_new_i3c_devs() registers newly discovered devices
while holding i3c_bus_normaluse_lock(), a down_read(). device_register()
can immediately probe the device, and probe callbacks typically invoke
I3C helpers that take i3c_bus_normaluse_lock() again, leading to a
recursive acquisition of the same rwsem. rwsems do not support recursive
read locking and can deadlock when a writer is waiting. See the
"Recursive read locks" section of Documentation/locking/lockdep-design.rst.
For example, with Intel LPSS I3C, LOCKDEP generates a WARNING like:
# echo intel-lpss-i3c.0 > /sys/bus/platform/drivers/mipi-i3c-hci/unbind
# echo intel-lpss-i3c.0 > /sys/bus/platform/drivers/mipi-i3c-hci/bind
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
kworker/5:1/94 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88811c810d78 (&i3cbus->lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: i3c_device_match_id+0x45/0x370
but task is already holding lock:
ffff88811c810d78 (&i3cbus->lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: i3c_master_reg_work_fn+0x21/0x5f0
Fix this by separating device creation from device registration.
Populate desc->dev under the maintenance lock, collect the devices that
still need registration into a local list, then release the lock before
calling device_register(). Finally retake the lock and clean up any
devices that failed to register.
Use the maintenance lock rather than the normal-use lock while adding
device objects. A write-side maintenance lock prevents readers from
observing a partially initialized desc->dev during initial device
population, or desc->dev disappearing if registration fails.
The local list requires a list node, so add a list node member to struct
i3c_device. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cxl/mbox: Clamp mailbox output allocation to the payload size
CXL_MEM_SEND_COMMAND bounds the user's in.size to the mailbox payload
size but leaves out.size unbounded, then cxl_mbox_cmd_ctor() calls
kvzalloc(out.size). A large out.size drives a huge allocation, above
INT_MAX it WARNs and taints, and with panic_on_warn=1 it panics.
The transport __cxl_pci_mbox_send_cmd() already clamps the response copy
to min(out.size, payload_size, device len), so the output buffer is
never written beyond payload_size. Clamp the allocation to payload_size
too, matching the RAW path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject MEM_ALLOC BTF accesses past object bounds
BTF struct walks relax the struct-size check for accesses through a
trailing flexible array. That is valid for ordinary BTF type walking, but
PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC values point to objects allocated with the static
BTF type size.
When walking a MEM_ALLOC object, reject the access before applying the
flexible-array relaxation if the access range extends past the struct size.
Apply the same policy to struct ID matching so kfunc and kptr type checks
do not walk past the allocated object bounds either. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: dell-wmi-base: Fix handling of ultra performance key
The commit message of commit 5fbd827eb9c2 ("platform/x86: dell-wmi: Recognise or support new switches")
states that the ultra performance key contains additional data
after the type and code fields. The event data passed to
dell_wmi_process_key() is already parsed, so "buffer" already
starts after those two fields.
Use the correct index for accessing the first data field to avoid
a potential buffer overread. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject rdonly/rdwr_buf_size kfunc arguments that exceed u32 max
check_kfunc_args() detects a kfunc argument named rdonly_buf_size or
rdwr_buf_size and stores reg->var_off.value into meta->r0_size, a u64,
and does not bound it. check_kfunc_call() later copies that value into
the returned register's mem_size field:
meta->r0_size = reg->var_off.value;
...
regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.r0_size;
regs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size is u32. A constant whose upper 32 bits are set
gets truncated instead of causing a load-time rejection, so the verifier
records a PTR_TO_MEM register with an approximately 4 GiB mem_size for
whatever allocation the kfunc returned. A later access check against
that register uses the truncated, wrong bound.
Reject rdonly_buf_size/rdwr_buf_size values that exceed U32_MAX at the
point meta->r0_size is set. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: uac: validate rate list length before storing
UAC1 and UAC2 configfs rate-list attributes parse a comma-separated
list of sampling rates and store each parsed value in fixed-size arrays.
The arrays have UAC_MAX_RATES entries, but the store paths do not check
that the input contains at most that many tokens before writing through
opts->name##s[i++].
Writing more than ten rates therefore writes past the end of the
p_srates[] or c_srates[] array in struct f_uac1_opts or struct
f_uac2_opts.
With CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS enabled, writing an 11-entry rate list to the
UAC1 p_srate attribute reports:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_uac1.c:1669:1
index 10 is out of range for type 'int [10]'
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold
f_uac1_opts_p_srate_store
configfs_write_iter
vfs_write
ksys_write
do_syscall_64
The same reproducer against the UAC2 p_srate attribute reports:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds
drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_uac2.c:2087:1
index 10 is out of range for type 'int [10]'
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold
f_uac2_opts_p_srate_store
configfs_write_iter
vfs_write
ksys_write
do_syscall_64
Reject additional tokens once UAC_MAX_RATES entries have been parsed.
Also keep the original kstrdup() pointer for kfree(), because strsep()
advances the parsing cursor. Freeing the advanced cursor leaks the
original buffer on successful parses and can free an interior pointer on
some error paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix WARNING in bpf_tracing_link_release
The trampoline could be corrupted by the blindly
'tr->flags = BPF_TRAMP_F_TAIL_CALL_CTX' in verifier.
1. A fexit attached to a tail_call_reachable prog. 'tr->flags' became
'BPF_TRAMP_F_CALL_ORIG | BPF_TRAMP_F_TAIL_CALL_CTX'. And, the
trampoline would poke the target prog's nop insn using jmp insn instead
of call insn.
2. Another fexit loaded with the same tail_call_reachable prog target.
'tr->flags' became 'BPF_TRAMP_F_TAIL_CALL_CTX'.
3. Close the first fexit link. Due to no BPF_TRAMP_F_CALL_ORIG in
'tr->flags', the trampoline will fail to restore the prog's nop insn
using call insn.
[ 3.410719] WARNING: kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3551 at bpf_tracing_link_release+0x53/0x60, CPU#1: test_progs/98
...
[ 3.428793] bpf_link_free+0x58/0x130
[ 3.429293] bpf_link_release+0x23/0x30
Fix the warning by updating 'tr->flags' with '|=' and lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: ufs: core: Validate string descriptors
The string descriptor length includes a two-byte header while the UTF-16
payload starts after it. utf16s_to_utf8s() expects a count of UTF-16 code
units, not bytes. Passing the payload byte count can make it read beyond
the descriptor buffer.
Validate that the payload has an even byte count, pass a code-unit count to
the converter, and allocate sufficient UTF-8 output space.
The raw string buffer starts after the descriptor header but its size is
bLength. Copying bLength bytes from that pointer can read beyond the
response buffer.
Allocate a zeroed bLength-sized buffer and copy only the UTF-16
payload. This preserves the raw buffer size consumed by the RPMB device-ID
ABI while avoiding the overread. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/panthor: Add vm_bind region with kbo range overlap check
When a VM is created, caller has to specify the range of the address space
carve-out set aside for mapping kernel BO's. That means vm_bind mappings of
UM-exposed BO's should not intersect with that region, but at the moment
we're not checking this.
At first, I thought of giving these values to drm_gpuvm_init() through its
reserve_{offset, range} arguments, but it turns out that is meant for VM
address spans that are not managed through the usual drm_gpuvm split/merge
circuit, so storing the end of the user VA range at VM creation time and
doing a quick check in the vm_bind ioctl path was the simplest workaround.
The new check also makes sure vm_bind range doesn't overflow the size of a
64-bit unsigned integer. That was already being done further down the call
stack inside drm_gpuvm_sm_map -> drm_gpuvm_range_valid, but it's best to
fail early in the driver before GPUVM functions are invoked so that we
won't waste time allocating vm_bind context resources. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath12k: fix stride mismatch in mac_phy_caps_parse()
Currently, in ath12k_wmi_mac_phy_caps_parse(), kzalloc() sizes the
mac_phy_caps buffer as tot_phy_id * len, where len is clamped to
min(firmware_len, sizeof(struct ath12k_wmi_mac_phy_caps_params)). The
subsequent memcpy() destination advances by sizeof(full struct) per slot
via C pointer arithmetic, not by the clamped len. When firmware sends
short TLVs, the second and later slots are written past the end of the
allocation.
The reader in ath12k_pull_mac_phy_cap_svc_ready_ext() also indexes the
buffer with full-struct pointer arithmetic, so the allocation must match
that stride.
Fix by using kzalloc_objs(), which derives the element size from the
pointer type, making allocation size and pointer stride provably
consistent regardless of what len the firmware provides.
Tested-on: WCN7850 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HMT.1.1.c7-00108-QCAHMTSWPL_V1.0_V2.0_SILICONZ_UPSTREAM-3 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: fix stride mismatch in mac_phy_caps_parse()
Currently, in ath11k_wmi_tlv_mac_phy_caps_parse(), kcalloc() sizes the
mac_phy_caps buffer as tot_phy_id * len, where len is clamped to
min(firmware_len, sizeof(struct wmi_mac_phy_capabilities)). The subsequent
memcpy() destination advances by sizeof(full struct) per slot via C
pointer arithmetic, not by the clamped len. When firmware sends short
TLVs, the second and later slots are written past the end of the
allocation.
The reader in ath11k_pull_mac_phy_cap_svc_ready_ext() also indexes the
buffer with full-struct pointer arithmetic, so the allocation must match
that stride.
Fix by using kzalloc_objs(), which derives the element size from the
pointer type, making allocation size and pointer stride provably
consistent regardless of what len the firmware provides.
Compile tested only. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, x86: Fix trampoline stack size for 128-bit arguments
btf_distill_func_proto() accepts a function argument up to 16 bytes, so a
128-bit scalar such as __int128 reaches the x86 trampoline with
arg_size == 16. But the current implementation assumes an __int128
argument only needs one register, so the register save area is
under-allocated and save_args() overwrites adjacent stack slots.
Compute the register count from arg_size for all arguments to fix it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2/cluster: keep heartbeat local node stable
o2nm_node_local_store() handles local=0 by stopping o2net and setting
cl_local_node to O2NM_INVALID_NODE_NUM, but it leaves cl_has_local set.
That stale state makes o2nm_this_node() return 255, blocks a later local=1
attempt with -EBUSY, and can feed 255 to heartbeat users that call
o2nm_this_node() dynamically.
Clearing cl_has_local is required when the local node is reset. But
heartbeat threads can still be running at that point. They pin the local
node config item at startup, yet o2hb_do_disk_heartbeat() and thread
teardown re-read o2nm_this_node() for the local slot and for
o2nm_undepend_this_node(). Once local=0 has cleared the live local-node
state, those dynamic reads return O2NM_MAX_NODES, which is also the
invalid node number 255.
Store the local node number in the heartbeat region when the region
starts. Use that stable node for heartbeat slot writes/checks,
negotiation messages, and the final configfs undepend. Stop the heartbeat
loop when the current local node no longer matches the stored node, and
clear cl_has_local together with cl_local_node in the local=0 path so
nodemanager state matches node removal.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
KASAN slab-out-of-bounds in o2hb_do_disk_heartbeat+0x372/0xb30
RIP: 0010:memset+0xf/0x20
Read of size 8
Call trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0
print_report+0xd0/0x630
o2hb_do_disk_heartbeat+0x372/0xb30 (fs/ocfs2/cluster/heartbeat.c:1079)
srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
__virt_addr_valid+0x188/0x2f0
kasan_report+0xe4/0x120
o2hb_do_disk_heartbeat+0x5/0xb30 (fs/ocfs2/cluster/heartbeat.c:1079)
o2hb_thread+0x14e/0x770
kthread_affine_node+0x139/0x180
lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xda/0x190
trace_hardirqs_on+0x18/0x130
kthread+0x19d/0x1e0
ret_from_fork+0x37a/0x4d0
__switch_to+0x2d5/0x6f0
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: validate external xattr entries when reading metadata
ocfs2_validate_xattr_block() checks the xattr block header before the
block reaches higher-level xattr users, but it does not verify that a
non-indexed block's xh_count and entry offsets fit inside the block.
Indexed buckets likewise reach list/get consumers after ECC without an
entry-bounds check.
Use the flat xattr entry validator for non-indexed external xattr blocks,
and use a bucket-specific validator for indexed buckets at metadata read
time. The bucket validator keeps the entry array bounded by the first
bucket block while checking name/value offsets against the bucket block
they target.
Reject corrupted external xattr metadata before listxattr() or getxattr()
can walk out-of-range entry arrays or name/value offsets.
Validation reproduced this kernel report:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ocfs2_xattr_list_entries+0xd7/0x190
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88810a654007 by task ocfs2_xattr_lis/630
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0
print_report+0xce/0x630
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
ocfs2_xattr_list_entries+0xd7/0x190
ocfs2_listxattr+0x3f6/0x610
listxattr+0x90/0xe0
path_listxattrat+0xed/0x220
do_syscall_64+0x115/0x6a0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: qgroup: fix a wrong length calculation in qgroup_free_reserved_data()
In that function, we round down the start position and round up the
ending position.
But during the calculation of @len, we use "round_up(start + len,
sectorsize)", which is the rounded up end position, not the rounded up
length.
Which results a much larger length, and later we are still using
"start + len", which is completely incorrect.
Fix it by declaring a local @aligned_start and @aligned_len and use them
instead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: validate orphan slot during inode read
Patch series "ocfs2: validate active orphan slots during inode read".
OCFS2 trusts active ordinary and append-DIO orphan slots read from dinodes.
A corrupted slot can therefore index osb_orphan_wipes or the slot-local
system-inode cache outside their allocations before the corruption is
reported.
Patch 1 validates the ordinary orphan slot used by inode wipe processing.
Patch 2 validates the append-DIO orphan slot used by DIO completion and
orphan recovery. Both checks reject corrupt metadata at the existing inode
validation boundary.
This patch (of 2):
[BUG]
A corrupted dinode with OCFS2_ORPHANED_FL can carry an
i_orphaned_slot outside the mounted filesystem slot range.
ocfs2_wipe_inode() uses it to index osb_orphan_wipes before looking
up the orphan directory, causing an out-of-bounds memory access.
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ocfs2_get_system_file_inode+0x780/0x820 fs/ocfs2/sysfile.c:102
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800b767c00 by task kworker/u8:3/85
Call Trace:
...
ocfs2_get_system_file_inode+0x780/0x820 fs/ocfs2/sysfile.c:102
ocfs2_wipe_inode+0x292/0xf70 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:840
ocfs2_delete_inode fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1155 [inline]
ocfs2_evict_inode+0x6c9/0x1170 fs/ocfs2/inode.c:1295
evict+0x38e/0x8f0 fs/inode.c:810
iput_final fs/inode.c:1914 [inline]
iput fs/inode.c:1966 [inline]
iput+0x55b/0x8b0 fs/inode.c:1926
ocfs2_recover_orphans+0x610/0xe40 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:2374
ocfs2_complete_recovery+0x5af/0xd00 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:1373
...
[CAUSE]
ocfs2_validate_inode_block() validates i_suballoc_slot but leaves
the active ordinary orphan slot unchecked. Downstream consumers
assume that the value is smaller than osb->max_slots.
[FIX]
Reject an active i_orphaned_slot outside the slot range during
dinode validation, before the inode reaches orphan wipe processing. |
