| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
security/keys: fix missed RCU read section on lookup
Nicholas Carlini reports that the keyring code calls assoc_array_find()
in find_key_to_update() without holding the RCU read lock, while the
assoc_array_gc() code really is designed around removing the node from
the tree and then freeing it after an RCU grace-period.
The regular key handling doesn't see this because holding the keyring
semaphore hides any lifetime issues, but the persistent key handling
uses a different model.
Instead of extending the keyring locking, just do the simple RCU locking
that the assoc_array was designed for. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix possible crash on l2cap_ecred_conn_rsp
If dcid is received for an already-assigned destination CID the spec
requires that both channels to be discarded, but calling l2cap_chan_del
may invalidate the tmp cursor created by list_for_each_entry_safe and
in fact it is the wrong procedure as the chan->dcid may be assigned
previously it really needs to be disconnected.
Calling l2cap_chan_clone directly may still lead to l2cap_chan_del so
instead schedule l2cap_chan_timeout with delay 0 to close the channel
asynchronously. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock/virtio: bind uarg before filling zerocopy skb
virtio_transport_send_pkt_info() allocates or reuses the zerocopy uarg
before entering the send loop, but virtio_transport_alloc_skb() still
fills the skb before it inherits that uarg. When fixed-buffer vectored
zerocopy hits MAX_SKB_FRAGS, io_sg_from_iter() may partially attach
managed frags and return -EMSGSIZE. The rollback path call kfree_skb()
to free an skb that carries SKBFL_MANAGED_FRAG_REFS but no uarg, so
skb_release_data() falls through to ordinary frag unref.
Pass the uarg into virtio_transport_alloc_skb() and bind it immediately
before virtio_transport_fill_skb(). This keeps control or no-payload skbs
untouched while ensuring success and rollback share one lifetime rule. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: dwc2: Fix use after free in debug code
We're not allowed to dereference "urb" after calling
usb_hcd_giveback_urb() so save the urb->status ahead of time. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: exthdrs: refresh nh after handling HAO option
ip6_parse_tlv() caches skb_network_header(skb) in nh while walking
IPv6 TLVs.
ipv6_dest_hao() may call pskb_expand_head() for a cloned skb, which can
move the skb head and invalidate the cached network header pointer.
Refresh nh after ipv6_dest_hao() returns so any trailing padding or TLVs
are parsed from the current skb head.
This matches the existing pattern used in ip6_parse_tlv() after helpers
that can modify skb header storage. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915: Fix potential UAF in TTM object purge
TLDR: The bo->ttm object might be changed by calling ttm_bo_validate(),
move casting it to an i915_tt object later to actually get the right
pointer.
A user reported hitting the following bug under heavy use on DG2:
[26620.095550] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xa56b6b6b6b6b6b8b: 0000 1 SMP NOPTI
[26620.095556] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 631 Comm: Xorg Not tainted 6.18.8 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
[26620.095558] Hardware name: ASRock B850M Steel Legend WiFi/B850M Steel Legend WiFi, BIOS 3.50 09/18/2025
[26620.095559] RIP: 0010:i915_ttm_purge+0x84/0x100 [i915]
[26620.095604] Code: 00 00 00 48 8d 54 24 10 48 89 e6 48 89 fb e8 83 aa ae ff 85 c0 75 6f 48 83 bb a8 01 00 00 00 74 2c 48 8b 45 78 48 85 c0 74 23 <48> 8b 78 20 48 c7 c2 ff ff ff ff 31 f6 e8 7a 73 e3 e0 48 8b 7d 78
[26620.095605] RSP: 0018:ffffc90005fd7430 EFLAGS: 00010282
[26620.095607] RAX: a56b6b6b6b6b6b6b RBX: ffff8881f46c3dc0 RCX: 0000000000000000
[26620.095608] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
[26620.095609] RBP: ffff888289610f00 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff88823b022000
[26620.095609] R10: ffff888103029b28 R11: ffff8881fc7f3800 R12: ffff88810b6150d0
[26620.095609] R13: ffff888289610f00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8881f46c3dc0
[26620.095610] FS: 00007f1004d86900(0000) GS:ffff88901c858000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[26620.095611] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[26620.095611] CR2: 00007f0fdf489000 CR3: 000000035b0c1000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
[26620.095612] PKRU: 55555554
[26620.095612] Call Trace:
[26620.095615] <TASK>
[26620.095615] i915_ttm_move+0x2b9/0x420 [i915]
[26620.095642] ? ttm_tt_init+0x65/0x80 [ttm]
[26620.095644] ? i915_ttm_tt_create+0xc6/0x150 [i915]
[26620.095667] ttm_bo_handle_move_mem+0xb6/0x160 [ttm]
[26620.095669] ttm_bo_evict+0x100/0x150 [ttm]
[26620.095671] ? preempt_count_add+0x64/0xa0
[26620.095673] ? _raw_spin_lock+0xe/0x30
[26620.095675] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0xd/0x30
[26620.095675] ? i915_gem_object_evictable+0xb7/0xd0 [i915]
[26620.095704] ttm_bo_evict_cb+0x6e/0xd0 [ttm]
[26620.095705] ttm_lru_walk_for_evict+0xa6/0x200 [ttm]
[26620.095708] ttm_bo_alloc_resource+0x185/0x4f0 [ttm]
[26620.095709] ? init_object+0x62/0xd0
[26620.095712] ttm_bo_validate+0x7a/0x180 [ttm]
[26620.095713] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x16/0x30
[26620.095714] __i915_ttm_get_pages+0xb0/0x170 [i915]
[26620.095737] i915_ttm_get_pages+0x9f/0x150 [i915]
[26620.095759] ? i915_gem_do_execbuffer+0xedc/0x2b40 [i915]
[26620.095786] ? alloc_debug_processing+0xd0/0x100
[26620.095787] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x16/0x30
[26620.095788] ? i915_vma_instance+0xa0/0x4e0 [i915]
[26620.095822] __i915_gem_object_get_pages+0x2f/0x40 [i915]
[26620.095848] i915_vma_pin_ww+0x706/0x980 [i915]
[26620.095875] ? i915_gem_do_execbuffer+0xedc/0x2b40 [i915]
[26620.095904] eb_validate_vmas+0x170/0xa00 [i915]
[26620.095930] i915_gem_do_execbuffer+0x1201/0x2b40 [i915]
[26620.095953] ? alloc_debug_processing+0xd0/0x100
[26620.095954] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x16/0x30
[26620.095955] ? i915_gem_execbuffer2_ioctl+0xc9/0x240 [i915]
[26620.095977] ? __wake_up_sync_key+0x32/0x50
[26620.095979] ? i915_gem_execbuffer2_ioctl+0xc9/0x240 [i915]
[26620.096001] ? __slab_alloc.isra.0+0x67/0xc0
[26620.096003] i915_gem_execbuffer2_ioctl+0x11a/0x240 [i915]
Results from decode_stacktrace.sh pointed to dereference of a file pointer
field of a i915 TTM page vector container associated with an object being
purged on eviction. That path is taken when the object is marked as no
longer needed.
Code analysis revealed a possibility of the i915 TTM page vector container
being replaced with a new instance inside a function that purges content
of the object, should it be still busy. That function is called,
indirectly via a more general function that changes the object's placement
and caching policy,
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: tlb: Flush walk cache when unsharing PMD tables
When huge_pmd_unshare() is called to unshare a PMD table, the
tlb_unshare_pmd_ptdesc() function sets tlb->unshared_tables=true
but the aarch64 tlb_flush() only checked tlb->freed_tables to
determine whether to use TLBF_NONE (vae1is, invalidates walk
cache) or TLBF_NOWALKCACHE (vale1is, leaf-only).
This caused the stale PMD page table entry to remain in the walk cache
after unshare, potentially leading to incorrect page table walks.
Fix by including unshared_tables in the check, so that when
unsharing tables, TLBF_NONE is used and the walk cache is properly
invalidated.
Here is the detailed distinction between vae1is and vale1is:
| Instruction Combination | Actual Invalidation Scope |
| ------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------|
| `VAE1IS` + TTL=`0` | All entries at all levels (full invalidation) |
| `VAE1IS` + TTL=`2` (L2) | Non-leaf at Level 0/1 + leaf at Level 2 |
| `VALE1IS` + TTL=`0` | Leaf entries at all levels (non-leaf not cleared) |
| `VALE1IS` + TTL=`2` (L2) | Leaf entry at Level 2 only | |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: add hook transactions for device deletions
Restore the flag that indicates that the hook is going away, ie.
NFT_HOOK_REMOVE, but add a new transaction object to track deletion
of hooks without altering the basechain/flowtable hook_list during
the preparation phase.
The existing approach that moves the hook from the basechain/flowtable
hook_list to transaction hook_list breaks netlink dump path readers
of this RCU-protected list.
It should be possible use an array for nft_trans_hook to store the
deleted hooks to compact the representation but I am not expecting
many hook object, specially now that wildcard support for devices
is in place.
Note that the nft_trans_chain_hooks() list contains a list of struct
nft_trans_hook objects for DELCHAIN and DELFLOWTABLE commands, while
this list stores struct nft_hook objects for NEWCHAIN and NEWFLOWTABLE.
Note that new commands can be updated to use nft_trans_hook for
consistency.
This patch also adapts the event notification path to deal with the list
of hook transactions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mac802154: llsec: add skb_cow_data() before in-place crypto
llsec_do_encrypt_unauth(), llsec_do_encrypt_auth(),
llsec_do_decrypt_unauth(), and llsec_do_decrypt_auth() all perform
in-place cryptographic transformations on skb data. They build a
scatterlist with sg_init_one() pointing into the skb's linear data area
and then pass the same scatterlist as both src and dst to the crypto API
(e.g. crypto_skcipher_encrypt/decrypt, crypto_aead_encrypt/decrypt).
On the RX path, __ieee802154_rx_handle_packet() clones the received skb
before handing it to each subscriber via ieee802154_subif_frame(). The
cloned skb shares the same underlying data buffer via reference
counting. When llsec_do_decrypt() subsequently modifies this shared
buffer in place, it corrupts data that other clones -- potentially
belonging to other sockets or subsystems -- still reference.
On the TX path, similar data sharing can occur when an skb's head has
been cloned (skb_cloned() returns true).
The fix is to call skb_cow_data() before performing any in-place crypto
operation. skb_cow_data() ensures that the skb's data area is not
shared: if the skb head is cloned or the data spans multiple fragments,
it copies the data into a private buffer that can be safely modified in
place. This is the same pattern used by:
- ESP (net/ipv4/esp4.c, net/ipv6/esp6.c)
- MACsec (drivers/net/macsec.c)
- WireGuard (drivers/net/wireguard/receive.c)
- TIPC (net/tipc/crypto.c)
Without this guard, in-place crypto on shared skb data leads to:
- Silent data corruption of other skb clones
- Use-after-free when the crypto API scatterwalk writes through a
page that has already been freed by another clone's kfree_skb()
- Kernel crashes under concurrent 802.15.4 traffic with security
enabled (KASAN/KMSAN reports slab-use-after-free)
Found by 0sec (https://0sec.ai) using automated source analysis. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
keys: Pin request_key_auth payload in instantiate paths
A: request_key() B: KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE_IOV
================ =========================
create auth key
store rka in auth key
wait for helper
get auth key
load rka from auth key
copy user payload
sleep on #PF
helper completed
detach and free rka
destroy auth key
wake up
use rka->target_key
**USE-AFTER-FREE**
Give request_key_auth payloads a refcount. Take a payload reference while
authkey->sem stabilizes the payload and revocation state. Hold that
reference across the instantiate and reject paths. Drop the auth key
owning reference from revoke and destroy.
[jarkko: Replaced the first two paragraphs of text with an actual
concurrency scenario.] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
exfat: fix potential use-after-free in exfat_find_dir_entry()
In exfat_find_dir_entry(), the buffer_head obtained from
exfat_get_dentry() is released with brelse(bh) before the fall-through
TYPE_EXTEND branch reads the directory entry through ep (which points
into bh->b_data):
brelse(bh);
if (entry_type == TYPE_EXTEND) {
...
len = exfat_extract_uni_name(ep, entry_uniname);
...
}
After brelse() drops our reference, nothing guarantees that the
underlying page backing bh->b_data remains valid for the subsequent
exfat_extract_uni_name() read. This is the same pattern fixed in
commit fc961522ddbd ("exfat: Fix potential use after free in
exfat_load_upcase_table()").
Move brelse(bh) so it runs after ep is no longer dereferenced on
each branch.
Confirmed on QEMU x86_64 with CONFIG_KASAN=y + CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=y
+ CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING=y on linux-next, using a crafted exFAT image
(long filename with same-hash collisions forcing the TYPE_EXTEND path).
With a debug-only invalidate_bdev() inserted between brelse(bh) and
the ep read to make the stale-deref window deterministic, the
unpatched kernel faults:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in exfat_find_dir_entry+0x133b/0x15a0
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff88801a5fa0c2
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:exfat_find_dir_entry+0x1188/0x15a0
With this patch applied, the same instrumented harness completes
cleanly under the same sanitizer stack. I have not reproduced a
crash on an uninstrumented kernel under ordinary reclaim; the
instrumented A/B establishes the lifetime violation and that the
patch closes it, not an unaided triggerability claim. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blk-cgroup: fix UAF in __blkcg_rstat_flush()
When multiple blkgs in the same blkcg are released concurrently,
a use-after-free can occur. The race happens when one blkg's
__blkcg_rstat_flush() removes another blkg's iostat entries via
llist_del_all(). The second blkg sees an empty list and proceeds
to free itself while the first is still iterating over its entries.
Move the flush from __blkg_release() (RCU callback) to blkg_release()
(before call_rcu). This ensures the RCU grace period waits for any
concurrent flush's rcu_read_lock() section to complete before freeing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfsd: release layout stid on setlease failure
nfs4_alloc_stid() publishes the new stid into cl->cl_stateids via
idr_alloc_cyclic() under cl_lock before returning to
nfsd4_alloc_layout_stateid(). When nfsd4_layout_setlease() then
fails, the error path frees the layout stateid directly with
kmem_cache_free() without ever calling idr_remove(), leaving the
IDR slot pointing at freed slab memory. Any subsequent IDR walker
(states_show, client teardown) dereferences the dangling pointer.
The correct teardown for an IDR-published stid is nfs4_put_stid(),
which removes the IDR slot under cl_lock, dispatches sc_free
(nfsd4_free_layout_stateid) to release ls->ls_file via
nfsd4_close_layout(), and drops the nfs4_file reference in its
tail.
A second issue blocks that switch: nfsd4_free_layout_stateid()
unconditionally inspects ls->ls_fence_work via
delayed_work_pending() under ls_lock, but
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&ls->ls_fence_work, ...) currently runs only
after the setlease call. On the setlease-failure path the
destructor would touch an uninitialized delayed_work.
nfsd4_alloc_layout_stateid()
nfs4_alloc_stid() /* idr_alloc_cyclic under cl_lock */
nfsd4_layout_setlease() /* fails */
nfs4_put_stid()
nfsd4_free_layout_stateid()
delayed_work_pending(&ls->ls_fence_work) /* needs INIT */
nfsd4_close_layout() /* nfsd_file_put(ls->ls_file) */
put_nfs4_file()
Fix by hoisting the ls_fenced / ls_fence_delay / INIT_DELAYED_WORK
initialization above the nfsd4_layout_setlease() call, and replace
the manual nfsd_file_put + put_nfs4_file + kmem_cache_free cleanup
with a single nfs4_put_stid(stp). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFSD: Fix SECINFO_NO_NAME decode error cleanup
nfsd4_decode_secinfo_no_name() currently initializes sin_exp after
decoding sin_style. If the XDR stream is truncated, the decoder returns
nfserr_bad_xdr before sin_exp is initialized.
Since commit 3fdc54646234 ("NFSD: Reduce amount of struct
nfsd4_compoundargs that needs clearing"), the inline iops array is not
cleared between RPC calls. A failed SECINFO_NO_NAME decode can therefore
leave sin_exp holding stale union contents from a previous operation.
The error response path still invokes nfsd4_secinfo_no_name_release(),
which calls exp_put() on a non-NULL sin_exp.
Initialize sin_exp before the first failable decode step, matching
nfsd4_decode_secinfo(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: zero-initialize GART table on allocation
GART TLB is flushed after unmapping but not after mapping. Since
amdgpu_bo_create_kernel() does not zero-initialize the buffer, when a
single PTE is written the TLB may speculatively load other uninitialized
entries from the same cacheline. Those garbage entries can appear valid,
and a subsequent write to another PTE in the same cacheline may cause the
GPU to use a stale garbage PTE from the TLB.
Fix this by calling memset_io() to zero-initialize the GART table with
gart_pte_flags immediately after allocation.
Using AMDGPU_GEM_CREATE_VRAM_CLEARED, SDMA-based clear will not work
since SDMA needs GART to be initialized to work.
(cherry picked from commit d9af8263b82b6eaa60c5718e0c6631c5037e4b24) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915/gem: Fix phys BO pread/pwrite with offset
sg_page() returns struct page pointer not (void *) so the scaling
of pread/pwrite is wrong for phys BO and wrong parts of BO would be
accessed if non-zero offset is used.
Last impacted platform with overlay or cursor planes using phys
mapping was Gen3/945G/Lakeport.
(cherry picked from commit 3e49a2f85070b2fb672c1e0fdba281a4ea3aebe6) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: mcast: Fix use-after-free when processing MLD queries
When processing an MLD query, a pointer to the multicast group address
is retrieved when initially parsing the packet. This pointer is later
dereferenced without being reloaded despite the fact that the skb header
might have been reallocated following the pskb_may_pull() calls, leading
to a use-after-free [1].
Fix by copying the multicast group address when the packet is initially
parsed.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __mld_query_work (net/ipv6/mcast.c:1512)
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881154b8e90 by task kworker/4:1/118
Workqueue: mld mld_query_work
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120)
print_address_description.constprop.0 (mm/kasan/report.c:378)
print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:482)
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595)
__mld_query_work (net/ipv6/mcast.c:1512)
mld_query_work (net/ipv6/mcast.c:1563)
process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314)
worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3397 kernel/workqueue.c:3478)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)
ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)
</TASK>
[...]
Freed by task 118:
kasan_save_stack (mm/kasan/common.c:57)
kasan_save_track (mm/kasan/common.c:78)
kasan_save_free_info (mm/kasan/generic.c:584)
__kasan_slab_free (mm/kasan/common.c:253 mm/kasan/common.c:285)
kfree (./include/linux/kasan.h:235 mm/slub.c:2689 mm/slub.c:6251 mm/slub.c:6566)
pskb_expand_head (net/core/skbuff.c:2335)
__pskb_pull_tail (net/core/skbuff.c:2878 (discriminator 4))
__mld_query_work (net/ipv6/mcast.c:1495 (discriminator 1))
mld_query_work (net/ipv6/mcast.c:1563)
process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3314)
worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3397 kernel/workqueue.c:3478)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)
ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tee: optee: prevent use-after-free when the client exits before the supplicant
Commit 70b0d6b0a199 ("tee: optee: Fix supplicant wait loop") made the
client wait as killable so it can be interrupted during shutdown or
after a supplicant crash. This changes the original lifetime expectations:
the client task can now terminate while the supplicant is still processing
its request.
If the client exits first it removes the request from its queue and
kfree()s it, while the request ID remains in supp->idr. A subsequent
lookup on the supplicant path then dereferences freed memory, leading to
a use-after-free.
Serialise access to the request with supp->mutex:
* Hold supp->mutex in optee_supp_recv() and optee_supp_send() while
looking up and touching the request.
* Let optee_supp_thrd_req() notice that the client has terminated and
signal optee_supp_send() accordingly.
With these changes the request cannot be freed while the supplicant still
has a reference, eliminating the race. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvs: clear the svc scheduler ptr early on edit
ip_vs_edit_service() while unbinding the old scheduler clears
the svc->scheduler ptr after the scheduler module initiates
RCU callbacks. This can cause packets to use the old
scheduler at the time when svc->sched_data is already freed
after RCU grace period.
Fix it by clearing the ptr early in ip_vs_unbind_scheduler(),
before the done_service method schedules any RCU callbacks.
Also, if the new scheduler fails to initialize when replacing
the old scheduler, try to restore the old scheduler while still
returning the error code. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: PCM: Fix wait queue list corruption in snd_pcm_drain() on linked streams
snd_pcm_drain() uses init_waitqueue_entry which does not clear
entry.prev/next, and add_wait_queue with a conditional
remove_wait_queue that is skipped when to_check is no longer
in the group after concurrent UNLINK. The orphaned wait entry
remains on the unlinked substream sleep queue. On the next
drain iteration, add_wait_queue adds the entry to a new queue
while still linked on the old one, corrupting both lists. A
subsequent wake_up dereferences NULL at the func pointer
(mapped from the spinlock at offset 0 of the misinterpreted
wait_queue_head_t), causing a kernel panic.
Replace init_waitqueue_entry/add_wait_queue/conditional
remove_wait_queue with init_wait_entry/prepare_to_wait/
finish_wait. init_wait_entry clears prev/next via
INIT_LIST_HEAD on each iteration and sets
autoremove_wake_function which auto-removes the entry on
wake-up. finish_wait safely handles both the already-removed
and still-queued cases. |
