| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| MIME::Field::ParamVal versions before 5.521 for Perl turn an RFC 2231 filename with a hyphenated language tag into an empty recommended filename.
A parameter such as filename*=utf-8'en-US'payload.exe is converted to an encoded word with the language tag appended to the charset. The decoder strips the language suffix only when it is a single word, so it cannot resolve the charset UTF-8*EN-US and returns an empty string. The recommended_filename() method returns that empty string rather than falling back to the name parameter.
Other mail readers return payload.exe. A remote sender can get an attachment past a policy that checks file extensions on the recommended filename. |
| MIME::Parser versions before 5.521 for Perl allow memory exhaustion via indented error messages from a truncated, deeply nested message.
Each stored parser diagnostic is indented by three spaces per nesting level. When a message nested N levels deep ends without its closing boundaries, every level logs an error at its own depth, so the stored diagnostics grow with the square of N. The defaults place no limit on nesting depth. |
| MIME::Field::ParamVal versions before 5.521 for Perl do not flag an ambiguous multipart boundary written as RFC 2231 continuations.
The boundary ambiguity checks look only at a plain boundary= parameter, and a boundary split into RFC 2231 sections (boundary*0=, boundary*1= and so on) is joined after they have run. A repeated section number is concatenated rather than reported as a duplicate. From version 5.518, an encoded word or trailing whitespace in such a boundary also goes unflagged, although multipart_boundary() decodes or strips it.
A remote sender can make MIME::Parser split a message on a different boundary than other mail readers, hiding an attachment from a filter that relies on ambiguous_content() while the recipient's mail client shows it. |
| MIME::Head versions from 5.518 before 5.521 for Perl decode a partly encoded multipart boundary without flagging the parse as ambiguous.
The multipart_boundary() method decodes RFC 2047 encoded words anywhere in the boundary, but the ambiguity check only fires when the whole value is one encoded word. A boundary such as abc=?us-ascii?Q?def?= is used as abcdef, and ambiguous_content() returns false.
Encoded words are not allowed in parameters, so other mail readers split the message on the literal value. A remote sender can hide an attachment from a filter that relies on ambiguous_content() while the recipient's mail client shows it. |
| MIME::Field::ParamVal versions before 5.521 for Perl allow one invalid Content-Type parameter to hide the parameters after it, including the multipart boundary.
Parameter parsing stops at the first parameter whose name it cannot read, such as x:y=1 or a name containing an 8-bit byte, and drops every parameter after it. When the boundary is among them, MIME::Parser keeps the multipart body as a single undecoded part without marking the parse as ambiguous.
Mail readers that skip the invalid parameter still find the boundary. A remote sender can hide an attachment from a filter that relies on ambiguous_content() while the recipient's mail client shows it. |
| MIME::Field::ParamVal versions before 5.521 for Perl allow CPU exhaustion via unclosed comments in header parameters.
The comment pattern used to parse Content-Type and Content-Disposition parameters scans from each "(" to the next ")". In a field with no ")", every "(" scans to the end of the header and fails, so parsing takes time quadratic in the header length. The field is parsed again on each attribute lookup, several times per MIME entity.
A 40 KB header takes about 7 seconds to parse once. |
| An Exposed IOCTL with Insufficient Access Control vulnerability [CWE-782] vulnerability in Fortinet FortiClientWindows 7.4.0 through 7.4.3, FortiClientWindows 7.2.0 through 7.2.9 may allow an authenticated local user to execute unauthorized code via fortips driver. Success of the attack would require bypassing the Windows memory protections such as Heap integrity and HSP. In addition, it requires a valid and running VPN IPSec connection. |
| Highcharts JS is a JavaScript charting library based on SVG. From 12.0.0 until 12.6.1 and 13.1.0, Highcharts falls back to assigning raw markup to innerHTML when DOMParser cannot return a document, before its allow-list is applied. In Chromium, the Trusted Types callback can throw while a beforeprint handler runs, so a page that redraws a chart during beforeprint can insert untrusted HTML text options into the hosting document. Event handlers in that markup then run in the page origin when printing begins. The issue affects HTML-rendered titles, labels, data labels, responsive text, and the Stock, Maps, and Gantt products shipped in the same package. This issue is fixed in 12.6.1 and 13.1.0. |
| Highcharts JS is a JavaScript charting library based on SVG. From 2.0.0 until 3.2.0, Highcharts Grid Pro input renderers copy the cells.renderer.attributes and cells.editMode.renderer.attributes maps to input or select elements with raw setAttribute calls. An attacker who controls column configuration can add event-handler attributes to every rendered row or to the control created when a cell enters edit mode. Script then runs in the hosting page origin when a user hovers over or focuses an input or begins editing. This issue is fixed in Grid Pro 3.2.0. |
| Highcharts JS is a JavaScript charting library based on SVG. Prior to 11.4.9, 12.6.1, and 13.1.0, Highcharts assigns credits.href to the window location when the credits label is clicked without checking the URL against the allowed-scheme list. An attacker who controls chart configuration can provide a javascript URL and run script in the origin of the hosting page when a user clicks the credits label. Highcharts Stock, Maps, and Gantt are included because they ship from the same package. This issue is fixed in 11.4.9, 12.6.1 and 13.1.0. |
| Highcharts JS is a JavaScript charting library based on SVG. From 10.0.0 until 11.4.9, 12.6.1, and 13.1.0, Highcharts applies breadcrumbs.style as SVG attributes rather than CSS and does not filter the attribute names. An attacker who controls chart configuration can provide event-handler keys through drilldown.breadcrumbs, navigation.breadcrumbs, or hierarchical series breadcrumb options. The keys become active handlers on the breadcrumb button and execute in the hosting page origin after the user navigates to a level and hovers over or activates the button. Styled-mode charts do not apply this option and are not affected. This issue is fixed in 11.4.9, 12.6.1 and 13.1.0. |
| Highcharts JS is a JavaScript charting library based on SVG. From 2.3.0 until 3.2.0, Highcharts Grid creates SVG path elements from rendering.icons object definitions and previously copied every child key with setAttribute. An attacker who controls Grid configuration can supply event-handler attribute names in an icon definition. Because custom icons override built-ins, the attacker can replace default sort or pagination icons, and script runs in the hosting page origin when a user hovers over or activates the affected icon. This issue is fixed in 3.2.0. |
| Szafir accepts any client or server certificate without performing certificate and hostname validation, allowing HTTPS connections without authenticating the remote server. An attacker can provide an arbitrary SSL/TLS certificate and cause the application to download an update file from their server.
This issue was fixed in version 2.0 build 708. |
| Szafir is vulnerable to Path Traversal in the uploaded filename. A man-in-the-middle attacker who can reroute update request to their server can prepare arbitrary XML file that will be saved in location chosen by attacker.
This issue was fixed in version 2.0 build 708. |
| Szafir and Szafir Weryfikująca are vulnerable to XML External Entity (XXE) injection. When a user signs or verify a crafted XML file containing a `DOCTYPE` with an external DTD reference, the parser processes external entities, allowing an attacker to read arbitrary files from the victim's filesystem.
This issue was fixed in Szafir version 2.0 build 708. Szafir Weryfikująca is no longer supported (End of Life) and has not been fixed. |
| Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in POSIMYTH Innovations The Plus Addons for Elementor Page Builder Lite the-plus-addons-for-elementor-page-builder allows Stored XSS.This issue affects The Plus Addons for Elementor Page Builder Lite: from n/a through 6.5.3. |
| Apache Kafka's code-generated protocol readers pre-size an array's collection from the element count declared by the sender. That count is checked only against the bytes remaining in the request buffer, which assumes about one byte per element; because most elements need several bytes, a request can declare far more elements than the buffer holds and still pass. For a keyed array the reader then allocates an ImplicitLinkedHashCollection of capacity (2 * count +1), so a request of a few tens of megabytes can force a heap allocation several times larger before any element is read. The pattern is emitted into every generated reader, so it affects all Kafka API types with an array field.
Impact:
Request parsing happens before any authorization check. On a listener that does not require authentication (for example PLAINTEXT), an unauthenticated attacker can send a few concurrent requests that each declare a very large=
array length and allocate many times their wire size in broker heap, crashing the broker with an OutOfMemoryError. The reporter demonstrated three concurrent ~90 MB ProduceRequest (v3) connections exhausting a 1 GB heap (~8x amplification). On listeners that require authentication, the attacker needs valid credentials but no specific ACL, since parsing precedes authorization..
Mitigation:
Upgrade to Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, or 4.4.0. Until then, lowering socket.request.max.bytes and restricting network access to broker listeners reduces, but does not remove, exposure.
Resolution:
From Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, and 4.4.0: generated readers cap the initial array pre-allocation at MessageUtil.MAX_PREALLOCATED_ARRAY_CAPACITY (1000) and grow it on demand, and reject a declared array length above MessageUtil.MAX_ARRAY_LENGTH (1,000,000). |
| A Kafka broker using SASL/OAUTHBEARER with the default validator (sasl.oauthbearer.jwt.validator.class=DefaultJwtValidator) selects its implementation from configuration. When sasl.oauthbearer.jwks.endpoint.url is set, the validator verifies the JWT signature. When that URL is unset (the default) and no verification key resolver is supplied, DefaultJwtValidator silently falls back to ClientJwtValidator, which does not verify the JWT signature, algorithm, or issuer - and the broker starts with no warning or error. This is the residual of CVE-2026-33557, whose fix restored signature verification only on the path where the JWKS endpoint URL is set.
Impact:
A broker in this state accepts any structurally valid JWT, including "alg":"none" tokens. An unauthenticated remote attacker who can reach the listener can forge a token asserting any principal - including configured superusers - and gain full access to the cluster. Only brokers that enable SASL/OAUTHBEARER validation without a JWKS endpoint URL (and without a custom verification key resolver) are affected; brokers that set the URL verify signatures and are not affected. Unlike CVE-2026-110952 (issuer/audience not enforced by default), here no signature is verified at all.
Mitigation (all affected versions, no upgrade required):
Set sasl.oauthbearer.jwks.endpoint.url for every listener/mechanism that uses OAuthBearerValidatorCallbackHandler, or configure a signature-verifying sasl.oauthbearer.jwt.validator.class.
Resolution:
From Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.1, and 4.4.0: a broker that would fall back to the non-verifying ClientJwtValidator fails to start with a ConfigException instead of running without signature verification (secure by default). |
| Several Kafka deserialization paths read a size or count field from input data and use it directly to allocate an array, collection, or byte buffer, with no check against the bytes actually available. A small crafted input can therefore declare a very large size and force a multi-gigabyte allocation. The affected paths are, in Kafka Streams, ProcessorRecordContext (header count), ChangedDeserializer (varint value length), CombinedKeySchema (foreign-key length, which could also produce a negative size), ProcessorMetadata (key length), and AssignmentInfo group-assignment decoding; and, in the clients library, ListDeserializer (used by ListSerde).
Impact:
An attacker can trigger the oversized allocation and raise an OutOfMemoryError that crashes the affected consumer or Kafka Streams thread; the broker and the rest of the cluster are unaffected. The reachable surface depends on the path: writing a crafted record to a Streams application's internal changelog or repartition topics, or committing crafted offset metadata to its consumer group (Streams internal paths); writing a crafted record to any topic that a consumer reads with ListSerde (ListDeserializer); or, as a member of a Streams consumer group, returning crafted assignment data when elected leader (AssignmentInfo). Because a crafted record remains in its topic, the error can recur on restart. The record size limit (max.message.bytes) does not help, because the allocation is driven by a size field rather than by the input's length.
Mitigation:
Upgrade to Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, or 4.4.0. Where authorization is enabled, restrict write access to each application's internal topics and consumer group to its own principal, and restrict who can produce to topics that are consumed with ListSerde.
Resolution:
From Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, and 4.4.0: these deserialization paths validate the declared size against the remaining input before allocating and reject input that fails the check. |
| Apache Kafka's code-generated readers for flexible protocol versions read a tagged-field count declared by the sender and retain a RawTaggedField object for each unknown field. That count was bounded only by the outer request frame size (socket.request.max.bytes); it was not checked against the remaining buffer bytes or capped. Because each entry can be encoded in as little as two bytes (unknown tag 0, size 0), a modest request can declare tens of millions of tagged fields and force one object allocation per declared field. Flexible request headers (header version 2, used by flexible APIs such as ApiVersions v3) are parsed this way, so the amplification applies to the request header itself.
Impact:
The flexible request header is parsed on the network thread before authorization, request dispatch, and request-time quota accounting. A client can send a request of a few tens of megabytes whose header declares about 20 million tagged fields, forcing roughly that many RawTaggedField allocations and exhausting broker heap or inducing process-wide GC stalls, denying broker service. Because the header is parsed for pre-authentication APIs such as ApiVersions (v3), the allocation can occur before authentication; no Kafka resource ACL or quota is required.
Mitigation:
Upgrade to Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, or 4.4.0. Until then, lowering socket.request.max.bytes and restricting network access to broker listeners reduces, but does not remove, exposure.
Resolution:
From Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, and 4.4.0: generated readers bounds-check the tagged-field count for flexible-versioned messages, rejecting a negative count, a count exceeding the remaining buffer bytes, or a count exceeding a fixed maximum (10,000), before any per-field allocation. |
