| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: skbuff: don't leave stale bytes in skb_copy_and_csum_bits()
When skb_copy_and_csum_bits() reaches unreadable frags it returns 0
after copying only the linear part, and the rest of the caller's buffer
is left as it was. The callers copy into a buffer that is about to go
out on the wire: an ICMP error quoting the offending packet, or a
driver's TX bounce buffer in skb_copy_and_csum_dev(). Neither buffer
is zeroed beforehand, so whatever was in memory there gets sent.
Zero the part of the buffer we didn't fill. The checksum usually
won't match the data any more, so the receiver will usually drop the
packet, but either way it no longer carries anything it shouldn't.
Only zero for a positive @len, a negative one from a broken caller must
not turn into a huge memset(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: bridge: avoid recursive multicast port cleanup
br_multicast_sg_del_exclude_ports() removes automatically added STAR_EXCL
port groups by calling br_multicast_del_pg(). For S,G entries, that
deletion calls back into br_multicast_sg_del_exclude_ports(), so a large
number of STAR_EXCL ports consumes one kernel stack frame per port and can
hit the stack guard page.
Keep the complete port-group deletion path for cleanup, but suppress the
S,G exclude-port cleanup while that helper is already walking the same
entry. Normal deletion callers retain the existing behavior. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: protect clcsock lifetime in smc_getname
smc_getname() dereferences smc->clcsock without holding
clcsock_release_lock. Link-group termination can release the CLC socket
through smc_close_active_abort() while the SMC socket is still open,
for example after shutdown(SHUT_WR).
A getsockname() caller can load smc->clcsock, then the termination worker
can clear the pointer and call sock_release() before the caller accesses
clcsock->ops or invokes getname(). This causes a use-after-free; if the
worker clears the pointer before the load, it causes a NULL dereference.
The syscall's file reference keeps the SMC socket alive but does not
prevent asynchronous release of its CLC socket.
KASAN reported the following with test-only timing instrumentation:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in smc_getname+0x19e/0x1b0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888109abb4e0 by task poc/103
Call Trace:
smc_getname+0x19e/0x1b0
do_getsockname+0xe5/0x170
__sys_getsockname+0x8c/0x100
Allocated by task 95:
sock_alloc_inode+0x1e/0x280
sock_alloc+0x3d/0x240
__sock_create+0x7e/0x430
smc_create+0x121/0x240
Freed by task 0:
kmem_cache_free+0xcc/0x340
rcu_core+0x50a/0x1850
Last potentially related work creation:
evict+0x446/0x6c0
smc_clcsock_release+0xa8/0xd0
smc_close_active_abort+0x26a/0x3a0
__smc_lgr_terminate.part.0+0x137/0x2e0
Hold clcsock_release_lock across the pointer check and the getname()
callback to serialize with smc_clcsock_release(). Return -EBADF if the
CLC socket has already been released, preserving the existing peer
state check and the callback's return value otherwise. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/packet: guard the ll header push in packet_rcv_spkt()
packet_rcv_spkt() restores the link layer header with
skb_push(skb, skb->data - skb_mac_header(skb));
That subtraction is only meaningful when the device actually has a link
layer header. packet_rcv() and tpacket_rcv() both wrap it in
dev_has_header(), which is also the predicate the block comment at the
top of the file states the restore in terms of; packet_rcv_spkt() does
not. commit d549699048b4 ("net/packet: fix packet receive on L3
devices without visible hard header") introduced the helper and changed
the two call sites, and this one stayed behind.
A device without a visible ll header can leave skb->mac_header at the
0xFFFF sentinel that __alloc_skb() initialises it to. A CAN skb does:
init_can_skb() sets pkt_type and ip_summed but does not reset the
headers, and commit 9f10374bb024 ("can: remove private CAN skb
headroom infrastructure") dropped the skb_reset_*_header() calls that
used to be there. skb_mac_header() is then 0xFFFF, the length becomes
a large negative number and skb_push() reports it through
skb_under_panic() -- from softirq context, so it is a full system panic
even with panic_on_oops=0:
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffffffff8bd21bc1 len:-65455 put:-65471 head:... data:... tail:0x50 end:0x180 dev:can0
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:214!
RIP: 0010:skb_panic+0x50/0x60
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
skb_push+0x38/0x40
packet_rcv_spkt+0xe1/0x170
__netif_receive_skb_core.constprop.0+0x7e8/0xd30
...
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
The socket type is reachable: packet_create() accepts SOCK_PACKET
alongside SOCK_RAW and SOCK_DGRAM behind the same CAP_NET_RAW check,
and neither the socket length nor a capability check keeps it away
from a CAN interface.
The missing skb_reset_*_header() calls in init_can_skb() are a
regression in their own right and are being fixed separately, but a
packet socket should not turn a link layer that did not initialise its
mac header into a kernel panic. Guard the push the way the other two
receive paths do.
Tested on v7.3-rc5 under QEMU with a slcan device on a pty, which is
the driver RX path: vcan does not reproduce it, because can_send()
resets the headers on the way out. One SOCK_PACKET socket bound to
can0 and one frame written into the line discipline panics an
unpatched kernel with the trace above; the same image with this patch
prints no panic and powers off normally. Both kernels are this tree,
defconfig plus CONFIG_CAN_SLCAN=y, differing only in this hunk. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mmc: sdhci-sprd: disable runtime PM on remove
sdhci_sprd_probe() enables runtime PM, while sdhci_sprd_remove() does
not perform the corresponding runtime PM cleanup.
The probe failure path disables runtime PM before disabling the clocks,
but the normal remove path directly disables clocks that are also
managed by the runtime PM callbacks. If the device is runtime
suspended, those clocks may already be disabled.
Resume the device before removal, disable runtime PM and drop the
temporary runtime PM reference before disabling the clocks.
This issue was found by manual code inspection. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-crypt: reject the lmk IV mode with AEAD ciphers
A "capi:" table line that pairs an AEAD cipher with the lmk IV mode,
for example "capi:gcm(aes)-lmk" with the integrity:28:aead option,
causes an oops when it is loaded. lmk sets tfms_count to 64, but
crypt_alloc_tfms_aead only allocates one transform, so crypt_setkey
reads past the end of the tfms_aead array and calls crypto_aead_setkey
on the values it finds there.
lmk exists for compatibility with Loop-AES, which uses CBC, so refuse
it with an AEAD cipher rather than allocate 64 AEAD transforms. The
check cannot go in crypt_iv_lmk_ctr with the other lmk checks, because
the IV constructor runs after crypt_set_key.
Note that this is not a security bug because the memory corruption can
only be triggered by root. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
memstick: core: wait for request completion before freeing card
In memstick_alloc_card() and memstick_set_rw_addr(),
wait_for_completion_timeout() is used to wait for device identification
and address configuration requests to complete.
The memstick subsystem does not provide an abort or cancellation
callback in struct memstick_host for in-flight requests. If
wait_for_completion_timeout() expires (for instance, when a USB transfer
or command retry is delayed), memstick_alloc_card() returns an error and
frees the memstick_dev structure via kfree(card).
However, the host controller driver (such as rtsx_usb_ms) is still
running the request asynchronously in worker context. When the transfer
eventually finishes, the driver writes into host->req->data, which
points to memory inside the already freed card structure. This leads to
a KASAN slab-use-after-free write:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ms_read_bytes+0x8fe/0x990
Write of size 1 at addr ffff88813c188079 by task kworker/1:5/5239
Workqueue: events rtsx_usb_ms_handle_req
Call Trace:
ms_read_bytes+0x8fe/0x990 drivers/memstick/host/rtsx_usb_ms.c:450
rtsx_usb_ms_issue_cmd drivers/memstick/host/rtsx_usb_ms.c:477 [inline]
rtsx_usb_ms_handle_req+0x557/0x1a00 drivers/memstick/host/rtsx_usb_ms.c:531
process_one_work+0xac7/0x1b10 kernel/workqueue.c:3396
worker_thread+0x5ef/0xe50 kernel/workqueue.c:3560
kthread+0x373/0x450 kernel/kthread.c:436
Allocated by task 1662:
memstick_alloc_card drivers/memstick/core/memstick.c:383 [inline]
memstick_check+0x2c1/0x10d0 drivers/memstick/core/memstick.c:452
process_one_work+0xac7/0x1b10 kernel/workqueue.c:3396
Freed by task 1662:
kfree+0x20c/0x650 mm/slub.c:6792
memstick_alloc_card drivers/memstick/core/memstick.c:420 [inline]
memstick_check+0x72b/0x10d0 drivers/memstick/core/memstick.c:452
process_one_work+0xac7/0x1b10 kernel/workqueue.c:3396
Host controller drivers (rtsx_usb_ms, jmb38x_ms, tifm_ms, r592) already
implement their own hardware and bus timeouts, and callers in
mspro_block and ms_block already rely on wait_for_completion()
unconditionally.
Replace wait_for_completion_timeout() with wait_for_completion() in
memstick_set_rw_addr() and memstick_alloc_card() so that the card
structure is never freed while an asynchronous request is in flight. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: validate deauth frame length before reason access
ieee80211_rx_mgmt_deauth() reads the deauth reason code before checking
that the fixed field is actually present in the received frame.
Validate the deauth frame length first and only then read the reason
code. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_scmi: Validate BASE_ERROR_EVENT payload size
BASE_ERROR_EVENT carries a variable number of message reports,
with the count encoded in error_status. The notification parser used
that count without checking whether the received payload contained all
reported entries.
Reject truncated payloads before copying the report array. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_scmi: Validate SENSOR_UPDATE payload size
SENSOR_UPDATE carries one or more sensor readings after the fixed
notification header. The parser derives the expected reading count
from the sensor description, but it did not verify that the received
payload contains those entries before parsing them.
Reject truncated update notifications before reading the variable
array. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xen/gntalloc: validate grant count before allocation
gntalloc_ioctl_alloc() allocates the grant-id array before checking
whether the requested count fits within the global grant limit. Counts
above that limit cannot succeed, so reject them before the
user-controlled allocation reaches kcalloc().
Use a subtraction-based check while holding gref_mutex so adding the
requested count cannot wrap. Also cast the count before advancing the
per-file index so the page-size multiplication is performed in 64-bit
arithmetic. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix lease break and ack state handling
Do not skip valid lease states containing WRITE_CACHING when breaking
level-II/read leases for writes and truncates.
Handle lease break acknowledgments according to the SMB2 rule that the
acknowledged state must be a subset of the server's break target. Apply
the acknowledged state directly and keep the break pending on failed ACKs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mailbox: imx: Add a channel shutdown field
sashiko complained about possible teardown problem. The scenario
CPU 0 CPU 1
imx_mu_isr() imx_mu_shutdown()
imx_mu_xcr_rmw(priv, IMX_MU_RCR, 0, IMX_MU_xCR_RIEn(priv->dcfg->type, cp->idx));
imx_mu_specific_rx()
imx_mu_xcr_rmw(priv, IMX_MU_RCR, IMX_MU_xCR_RIEn(priv->dcfg->type, 0), 0);
free_irq()
The RX event remains enabled because in this short window the RX event
was disabled in ->shutdown() while the interrupt was active and then
enabled again by the ISR while ->shutdown waited in free_irq().
This race requires timing and if happens can be problematic on shared
handlers if the "removed" channel triggers an interrupt. In this case
the irq-core will shutdown the interrupt with the "nobody cared"
message.
Introduce imx_mu_con_priv::shutdown to signal that the channel is
shutting down. This flag is set with the lock held (by
imx_mu_xcr_clr_shut()). The unmask side uses imx_mu_xcr_set_act() which
only enables the event if the channel has not been shutdown and
serialises on the same lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mailbox: imx: Use devm_pm_runtime_enable()
sashiko complained about early usage of the device while probe isn't
completed. This can be mitigated by delaying the pm_runtime_enable()
into the removal path instead doing it early. This ensures that in an
error case the device is removed (and imx_mu_shutdown()) before
pm_runtime_disable() so we don't have to do this manually.
For the order to work, lets move devm_mbox_controller_register() until
after the pm-runtime part. So the reverse order will be mbox-controller
removal followed by disabling pm runtime.
Use devm_pm_runtime_enable(), remove manual pm_runtime_disable()
invocations and move the pm_runtime handling in probe before
devm_mbox_controller_register(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdkfd: Properly acquire queue buffers in CRIU restore
When kfd_queue_acquire_buffers() was split off from
set_queue_properties_from_user(), set_queue_properties_from_criu()
was missed. Thus, set_queue_properties_from_criu() is not
filling out the buffer fields of queue_properties, which
can come up when subsequent code expects them to be non-null.
Add the proper call to kfd_queue_acquire_buffers(), and also
use the right cast types in set_queue_properties_from_criu()
(which were missed at the same time)
(cherry picked from commit 88ed96abbbe27b70193544fbc1ee06448c274714) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
namespace: refuse an automount below a mount that is in no namespace
It's possible to add autmounts even when the parent mount isn't in the
mount namespace of the caller. The only requirement we have is that the
parent mount namespace must not be NULL, i.e., unmounted.
Problem is that clone_private_mount() has MNT_NS_INTERNAL which makes
that trivially true. So that passes the test and attach_recursive_mnt()
accepts that as a mount point and funny enough, count_mounts()
dereferences MNT_NS_INTERNAL. The problem is it is an error pointer...
So we can reach this in userspace via fanotify. A filesystem mark on the
lower filesystem of an overlay reports paths on the layer clone and
reading the event hands out a descriptor on it. For example with debugfs
as the lower layer it goes kaboom:
openat(evfd, "tracing", O_DIRECTORY)
Oops: general protection fault
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x1d0-0x1d7]
RIP: 0010:count_mounts+0x35/0x200
attach_recursive_mnt
finish_automount
And since that sleeping beauty happens under namespace_sem held for
writing every mount operation on the system blocks from then on.
Congrats.
Use is_mounted() instead which rejects unmounted and internal mounts
alike. The open fails with EINVAL just as it did before
clone_private_mount() used MNT_NS_INTERNAL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
namespace: unhash a dentry before detaching the mounts on it
unlink(), rmdir() and rename() remove the entry from the filesystem,
call detach_mounts() on the entry with the inode locked and then call
d_delete() once the inode is unlocked.
The thing is that between detach_mounts() and d_delete() the dentry is
still hashed and positive. But after detach_mounts() nothing covers the
dentry anymore. A lookup that finds this dentry in the dcache can
uncover what the mounts hid.
That's a problem when unlinking files or directories that are
mountpoints in other mount namespaces. Everybody who had the underlying
entry covered can race the detach_mount() call until d_delete() has run.
The race window isn't all that small. It encompasses namespace_unlock()
with a full synchronize_rcu_expedited() grace period and the
inode_unlock() of the entry.
In my experiments three walkers that kept trying read an overmounted
file in 11938 of the 16140 unlinks that removed its mountpoint from a
bind mount of the filesystem within a minute.
Fun fact, d_invalidate() has the same ordering problem but gets it
right. It unhashes the dentry first and detaches the mounts afterwards.
Let's do the same in __detach_mounts():
- A lookup that hasn't found the dentry yet misses it in the dcache and
waits for the directory lock that the caller holds until the name is
gone for good.
- A lockless lookup that found it already fails the mount_lock check
while the dentry still counts as a mountpoint and the d_seq check once
it doesn't, and retries.
This fixes the lockless path. We still need to fix the reference count
lookup in a follow-up patch.
So d_drop() the dentry. The dentry stays positive and held but can't be
found anymore. Then proceed with the detach and unlink.
Reproducer:
The reads were counted with the program below, three walkers for 60 s
in a VM with 4 CPUs. The race window is stretched with the debug patch
pasted here. fs.detach_race_walk_us sleeps in lookup_fast() once it
found a mountpoint dentry and before its mounts are crossed.
fs.detach_race_unlink_us sleeps in vfs_unlink() between detach_mounts()
and d_delete().
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/*
* unlink_covered: unlink a file that is a mountpoint in a detached copy of
* its mount, against lookups that open it through that copy.
*
* A is a tmpfs with the file f1 (content SECRET_F) and the plain file
* MARK_A. A' is an open_tree(OPEN_TREE_CLONE) copy of A with MARK_A bound
* on A'/f1, held through an O_PATH fd on its root once the tree fd is
* closed. Walkers open f1 through that fd while the driver unlinks A/f1,
* where nothing is mounted on it. A walker may read MARK_A or get ENOENT.
* A read of SECRET_F is a hit: the name was found after its mount was
* gone. The lockless walks use openat2(RESOLVE_CACHED).
*
* usage: unlink_covered [-t seconds] [-w walkers]
*/
#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#endif
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <stdatomic.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <linux/openat2.h>
#ifndef __NR_open_tree
#define __NR_open_tree 428
#endif
#ifndef __NR_move_mount
#define __NR_move_mount 429
#endif
#ifndef __NR_openat2
#define __NR_openat2 437
#endif
#ifndef OPEN_TREE_CLONE
#define OPEN_TREE_CLONE 1
#endif
#ifndef OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC
#define OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC O_CLOEXEC
#endif
#ifndef MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH
#define MOVE_MOUNT_F_EMPTY_PATH 0x00000004
#endif
#define WORK "/tmp/uc"
#define ADIR WORK "/A"
static int duration = 60, nwalkers = 3;
static atomic_int stop, writer_waiting;
static pthread_rwlock_t cur_lock = PTHREAD_RWLOCK_INITIALIZER;
static int cur_fd = -1; /* the root of A', -1 wh
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
namespace: don't let a pseudo dentry become the root of a mount
d_alloc_pseudo() hands out dentries for pipes, sockets and other files
that are never anyone's child or parent. They carry DCACHE_NORCU and
dentry_free() frees them right away because no lockless path walk can
ever reach them. That holds as long as such a dentry isn't the root of
a mount. But bind mounting /proc/self/fd/<fd> of such a file does
exactly that.
Most callers of alloc_file_pseudo() put their files on kernel-internal
mounts and may_copy_tree() refuses those. bpf_token_create() doesn't. It
places the token file on the bpffs mount the caller handed it and that
mount is in the caller's mount namespace so the clone goes through:
mount --bind /proc/self/fd/<token> <file>
open_tree(tokfd, "", AT_EMPTY_PATH | OPEN_TREE_CLONE) + move_mount()
__follow_mount_rcu() then loads ->mnt_root of that mount, reads d_seq
and d_flags of the dentry and only then checks mount_lock. The dentry
can be gone by then. The final mntput() of an unmounted parent unhooks
a child that stayed attached to it under mount_lock alone. When the
child's holder does the final put right after that the root is dput()
and freed immediately while a walker that found the mount hashed still
looks at it.
Refuse to clone a mount with a DCACHE_NORCU dentry as its root. Nothing
sensible can be done with a bind mount of a bpf token anyway. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
namespace: check the mounts before reading their parents in pivot_root()
path_pivot_root() reads the parents of new_root and of the caller's root
and checks whether they are shared before it checks that either mount is
in the caller's mount namespace. Only namespace_sem is held. That's fine
for a mount that is in the caller's mount namespace.
But new_root can be a file descriptor to a mount that has been unmounted
and that only the file descriptor keeps alive. If that mount stayed
attached to its parent when it was unmounted nothing pins the parent for
it. The final mntput() of the parent unhooks the children under
mount_lock alone and frees the parent afterwards:
pivot_root() close(fd), last ref on the parent
------------ ---------------------------------
ex_parent = new_mnt->mnt_parent
mntput_no_expire_slowpath()
__umount_mnt(new_mnt)
cleanup_mnt()
call_rcu()
IS_MNT_SHARED(ex_parent)
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in path_pivot_root+0xf1a/0x1840
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881047382f8 by task pivot_widen/157
path_pivot_root+0xf1a/0x1840
__x64_sys_pivot_root+0x165/0x190
The same goes for the caller's root via chroot(). Both outcomes of the
check end in EINVAL so nothing but the read itself goes wrong. It's the
same thing commit bb4609405752 ("statmount: read the parent of an
unmounted mount under mount_lock") fixed for statmount().
Check that both mounts are in the caller's namespace before their
parents are read. Every path returns EINVAL either way. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: hub: use shorter 120ms post resume hold for SS root hubs
Holding a USB3 hub PM runtime reference for 200ms at hub resume triggers
an AMD platform issue. Users running Android adb report crashes after
adb has been polling and waking up the USB subsystem once a second for
some time. Vendors are working on a solution. Disabling USB runtime PM
is one way to prevent this issue, but it is also proven that reducing the
hold time to 120ms in resume also mitigates it. See Link for more
details.
Reducing the hold time to 120ms for the USB3 roothub is in itself a valid
change and optimization, as the current 200ms is excessive: a root hub
has no upstream suspended hub whose wake propagation needs to be
accounted for, but still need some time for USB3 link training to
complete.
Keep the 200ms hold for external hubs that commit 8f5b7e2bec1c
("usb: hub: fix detection of high tier USB3 devices behind suspended
hubs") is intended for. |
